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Articles
Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance
in the European Union: Striking the Proper
Balance
LILIAN V. FAULHABER*
As the need to raise revenue becomes more pressing
and public opposition to tax avoidance increases, the
European Court of Justice has made it more difficult
for the twenty-seven Member States of the European
Union to prevent tax avoidance and shape fiscal poli-
cy. This article introduces the new anti-avoidance
doctrine of the European Court of Justice and analyz-
es it from the perspective of taxpayers, Member States
and the European Union legal order as a whole. This
doctrine is problematic because it has created a legis-
lative vacuum in Europe. No European Union institu-
tion has the authority to regulate direct taxation with-
out the unanimous support of all twenty-seven
Member States. As the European Court of Justice
strikes down Member State efforts to prevent tax
avoidance, no institution can step in to replace these
Member State provisions. Member States are thus
losing sovereignty over policing tax avoidance, but no
legislative move toward an integrated approach is
possible without the support of Member States. This
article proposes several solutions to the problems
posed by the doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, efforts by taxpayers to avoid or evade taxa-
tion have filled the news. From the agreement by world leaders at
the G20 summit in April 2009 to publicize a list of tax havens' to
growing awareness of investors failing to report offshore bank ac-
counts,2 efforts both to avoid taxation and to prevent such avoidance
have captured the public attention. This is perhaps not surprising
given the economic climate. As budgets shrink, raising revenue by
way of taxation becomes increasingly important, and public outrage
1. See Tax Haven Blacklists to Be Issued Soon, REUTERS UK, April 2, 2009, available
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE5313LS20090402 (last visited August 11,
2009).
2. See Editorial, Oh, That Account, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/1l/19/opinion/19mon2.html (last visited November 28,
2009).
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at attempts to avoid taxation increases. In Europe, however, the
twenty-seven member state countries (Member States) of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) are losing the ability to respond fully to tax avoid-
ance. Over the past ten years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ or
Court) has created a doctrine limiting the ability of Member States to
police tax avoidance, effectively making Europe more open to tax
avoidance just as raising revenue becomes even more necessary for
Member State survival.
This Article introduces the ECJ's recently created anti-
avoidance doctrine, analyzes its far-reaching consequences and pro-
poses a variety of responses. The effect of the doctrine can best be
understood by considering President Obama's recent proposal to curb
international tax avoidance. In its press release announcing interna-
tional tax reforms, the White House stated with disproval that
"[n]early one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corpora-
tions in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermu-
da, the Netherlands, and Ireland." 3 The rules that the White House
proposes strengthening are just the types of rules-referred to in this
Article as anti-avoidance rules-that the European Court of Justice is
striking down. Because of the ECJ's anti-avoidance doctrine, Mem-
ber States cannot pass rules that would prevent tax avoidance in the
Netherlands and Ireland-both Member States themselves-unless
they apply only to "wholly artificial arrangements." What are wholly
artificial arrangements? Taxpayers and Member States remain with-
out definite guidance, but the ECJ has made clear that far fewer
transactions can be prohibited in the EU than Member States would
like.
Part II of this Article introduces readers to the ECJ's new an-
ti-avoidance doctrine, which this Article labels the "wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine." This doctrine is effectively a principle of
limitation, pursuant to which Member State anti-avoidance rules are
limited to preventing only wholly artificial arrangements. The whol-
ly artificial arrangements doctrine grew out of the ECJ's freedom of
movement jurisprudence, and the Court has developed this doctrine
in the context of cases challenging the legitimacy of Member State
anti-avoidance rules (anti-avoidance cases). While many commenta-
tors have previously addressed the ECJ's fairly recent incursion into
the area of direct taxation 4 and some have referred specifically to
3. Press Release, The White House, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens
and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009).
4. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, What Can the US Supreme Court and the
European Court of Justice Learn from Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, in 14
COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
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Member State efforts to justify measures with reference to prevention
of tax avoidance,5 this Article is the first of its kind to introduce and
chart the development of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine
from a U.S. perspective.
Part III situates the doctrine in the context of other anti-
avoidance doctrines, as well as the ECJ's abuse of law jurisprudence,
and analyzes the doctrine along three dimensions. First, from the
point of view of taxpayers in the EU, the wholly artificial arrange-
ments doctrine suffers from unpredictability and ambiguity while al-
so creating an environment of greater tax avoidance. For Member
States, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine is problematic be-
cause it requires them to amend or overtum domestic anti-avoidance
rules, thereby limiting their ability to raise revenue and shape fiscal
policy. Finally, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine is prob-
lematic for the EU legal order as a whole because it creates a legisla-
tive vacuum in which the ECJ strikes down anti-avoidance rules, but
no other EU institution has the authority to police tax avoidance on
an EU-wide basis without the unanimous support of all twenty-seven
Member States. Member State sovereignty is threatened, tax avoid-
ance is more likely and no solution to this impasse currently exists.
Some may argue that the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine and the associated loss of Member State tax authority over po-
licing tax avoidance are the logical next step in the Court's free
movement jurisprudence. Many commentators have written about
the major changes to corporate law that the ECJ's recent decisions
US SUPREME COURT'S TAX JURISPRUDENCE 465, 465 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds.,
2007) ("In the last twenty years, but with increasing frequency in the last five, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted the Treaty of Rome aggressively to strike down
numerous Member State income tax rules on the ground that they were discriminatory.");
Ruth Mason, US Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice, in 14 COMPARATIVE
FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE US SUPREME
COURT'S TAX JURISPRUDENCE 405, 407 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007) ("Although
the ECJ rendered no decisions on income taxation for its first thirty years, it has made up for
that initial quiescence with a vengeance. Over the last twenty years, the ECJ invalidated a
wide variety of important and longstanding domestic tax laws on the theory that they
resulted in nationality discrimination by preferring resident taxpayers."); Michael J. Graetz
& Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic
Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186 (2006); Taxing Judgments, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 28, 2004, at 67 (quoted in Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative
Analysis of US and EU Approaches, in 14 COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE US SUPREME COURT's TAX JURISPRUDENCE 191,
195 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007)) ("While European Union governments do their
best to avoid harmonizing taxation, the EU's court of justice is busy doing it for them.").
5. RUTH MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 101-O5
(2005).
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have wrought,6 while others have argued that Member States effec-
tively agreed to the unforeseen effects of integration when they
joined the EU.7 Direct taxation, however, differs from other areas
that have been affected by the Court's drive for integration because it
falls under Article 94 of the EC Treaty, a treaty provision that is un-
derstood to require the unanimous consent of the Member States for
EU legislation in this area. 8 The vacuum created by the wholly ar-
tificial arrangements doctrine is notable because it results from the
EU's asymmetric approach to direct taxation. In the area of direct
taxation, ECJ jurisdiction is coupled with a lack of authority on the
part of any other EU institution to pass related legislation without the
unanimous agreement of the twenty-seven Member States. This
asymmetry explains why the legislative vacuum does not exist in
other controversial areas of law, such as immigration or foreign poli-
6. See, e.g., Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution that Never Came and the
Revolution Coming-De Lasteyrie du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the
Changing Corporate Law in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1219 (2006); Ronald Gilson,
Globalizing Corporate Governance, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (discussing the effect of
Centros on Europe's "equilibrium of diverse corporate regimes"); Carsten Gerner-Beuerle &
Michael Schillig, The Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment After Cartesio,
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1340964 (arguing that Cartesio "introduces new subtleties and
complexities which will render freedom of establishment for companies a rather ineffective
tool for the establishment of the Internal Market").
7. See, e.g., Servaas van Thiel, The Future of the Principle of Non-Discrimination in
the EU: Towards a Right to Most Favored Nation Treatment and a Prohibition of Double
Burdens?, in 14 COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE EUROPEAN UNION
COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE US SUPREME COURT'S TAX JURISPRUDENCE 331, 399 (Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter van Thiel 2007]; Servaas van Thiel, The Direct
Income Tax Case Law of the European Court of Justice: Past Trends and Future
Developments, 62 TAx L. REV. 143, 186 (2008) [hereinafter van Thiel 2008].
8. Article 94 provides: "The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market." Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec.
29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37. Although Article 94 does not specifically refer to direct
taxation, lawmakers, judges and academics have interpreted it to cover this area. See Tracy
A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 7 FLA.
TAx REV. 47, 64 (2005) (stating that "[iut is understood, however, that Article 94 of the
Treaty, in the chapter on 'Approximation of Laws,' also provides a legal basis for direct
taxation harmonization measures. This Article authorizes the Council, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission, to issue directives for the approximation of laws that
'directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market."'). All references to
the "EC Treaty" refer to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
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cy.9 Furthermore, legislative vacuums such as that created by the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine are becoming less common as
the EU as a whole moves away from a unanimity requirement toward
greater use of qualified majority voting.10 The Court's encroachment
on direct taxation is thus remarkable in that the Court has granted it-
self the ability to strike down Member State measures in an area in
which activity by EU institutions is forbidden without the approval of
all Member States-and in an area that is integral to the ability of
Member States to raise revenue. This is an unsustainable situation.
Part IV proposes three groups of responses to this situation.
Since the problems with the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine
ultimately stem from the impossibility of protecting both Member
State sovereignty over direct taxation and the freedom of movement
necessary for greater integration, the only possible long-term solution
is for the EU as a whole to prioritize either sovereignty or integra-
tion."I Due to the current political climate, however, such a decision
9. Although authors have criticized the ECJ's incursion into immigration law by way
of the free movement principle, see generally Francis J. Conte, Sink or Swim Together:
Citizenship, Sovereignty, and Free Movement in the European Union and the United States,
61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 331 (2007), the ECJ's recent decisions in this area have not led to a
legislative vacuum. Instead, since Member States and EU institutions have themselves been
involved in the development of a theory of EU citizenship, see id. at 345-47, the asymmetry
at work in direct taxation does not exist. ECJ jurisdiction co-exists with action by other EU
institutions. In the area of foreign policy, although EU institutions have limited legislative
authority, asymmetry is also not a problem because the ECJ lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Malgorzata Lawrynowicz, Note, A Foreign Policy for Europe: Integration or Illusion?, 16
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 691, 714 (2008). Thus, while other areas raise problems of either
aggressive ECJ encroachment or inactivity on the part of EU institutions, direct taxation is
striking for the vacuum created by the interaction of these two characteristics and the
resulting vacuum. Even when the institutions of the EU have received the unanimous
support necessary to overcome this vacuum, this has only occurred in narrow areas. See
infra note 32.
10. For more on the current requirements of qualified majority voting, see Art. 205(2).
See also Media Briefing from the Royal Economic Society, Decision-Making in the EU's
Council of Ministers: Why 'Qualified Majority Voting' Matters (Jan. 2008); Stephen M.
Johnson, Economics v. Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 417,
431 n.78 (2001) (stating that most environmental matters now require only qualified
majority voting); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L.
1, 42 n. 172 (2000) (stating that most data privacy protection also requires only qualified
majority voting).
11. This Article argues only that the Member States and institutions of the EU must
make a decision between sovereignty and integration, and it does not argue that one or the
other is the correct decision. Although it could be argued that the unanimity requirement of
Article 94 creates the same problems that existed in the Articles of Confederation, see
generally CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING
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is unlikely. 12 Along with discussing the ultimate long-term solutions
to the problems presented by the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine, Part IV proposes several shorter-term reforms and advocates
replacing the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine with a three-part
flexible standard. Part V concludes.
II. THE WHOLLY ARTIFICIAL ARRANGEMENTS DOCTRINE
Tax avoidance is any effort to avoid paying taxes that would
otherwise normally be payable. Unlike tax evasion, which is any
fraudulent or illegal effort to avoid paying taxes, tax avoidance en-
compasses all efforts to avoid taxation, including tax planning and
other efforts not specifically barred by law. 13 The existence of mul-
tiple taxing jurisdictions adds a layer of complexity to the world of
tax avoidance. Because different jurisdictions define and tax income
differently and there is no worldwide authority for overseeing taxa-
tion, nor is there a consistent information-sharing arrangement be-
tween jurisdictions, 14 taxpayers have many opportunities to shift in-
OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (2005), thus suggesting that integration is the logical next
step, it could also be argued that the different histories of the Member States make it less
likely that integration will be prioritized over sovereignty.
12. Although some commentators believe that greater integration is the foreseeable
next step since Member States implicitly agreed to greater integration by joining the EU, see
van Thiel 2008, supra note 7, the recent rejection of Member States to proposals to
harmonize taxation, see infra note 167, suggests that further integration is not inevitable.
13. Note that this Article does not attempt to further define tax avoidance, nor does it
advocate policing a certain level of tax avoidance. There is no universal definition of tax
avoidance, nor is it clear that transactions that one country considers tax avoidance would be
considered tax avoidance by another country. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax
Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 697, 703 (2009) ("Surprisingly, there is no widely accepted definition of a tax shelter,
meaning there is no agreed upon definition of the type of transaction we are trying to stop.").
This Article instead accepts countries' definitions of tax avoidance for what they are-
evidence of determinations by sovereign nations as to what is or is not acceptable within
their borders. For more on the negative effects of tax avoidance, see infra notes 102-05 and
accompanying text.
14. Although jurisdictions are embarking on specific information sharing agreements,
there is not yet an agreement that covers anywhere close to all the jurisdictions and income
associated with international tax avoidance. A prime example of the limited collaboration
currently taking place is the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC),
which was established in 2004 by the tax commissioners of Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Internal Revenue Service, Australia, Canada, U.K. and
US. Agree to Establish Joint Task Force, IR-2004-61 (May 3, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=123016,00.html. Japan agreed to join JITSIC in
2007. Internal Revenue Service, Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre
2010]
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come and assets between jurisdictions so as to reduce or avoid direct
taxation. International tax avoidance takes many forms, but two of
the primary categories of multi-jurisdictional tax avoidance are defer-
ral and allocation. 15
Tax avoidance by way of deferral occurs when a taxpayer
shifts income to a foreign jurisdiction where the income is not subject
to taxation-or is subject to lower taxation-and then defers taxation
until repatriation. 16 Deferral schemes often involve taxpayers creat-
ing or investing in a foreign corporation that is partially or wholly
owned by a domestic corporation. Taxpayers may, of course, engage
in cross-jurisdictional investment for numerous reasons unrelated to
tax avoidance. Certain types of transactions, however, are considered
by many jurisdictions to constitute impermissible deferral schemes. 17
Common anti-deferral regimes designed by jurisdictions to defeat
such schemes include controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, 18
foreign personal holding company (FPHC) rules, 19 and passive for-
eign investment company (PFIC), or foreign investment fund (FIF),
rules.20 Under all of these anti-deferral regimes, domestic sharehold-
ers of certain foreign companies are taxed as if they had received cur-
rent pro rata distributions of the foreign companies' undistributed in-
Expands and Opens a Second Office in the United Kingdom, IR-2007-104 (May 23, 2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/ newsroom/article/0,,id=170735,00.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2010). Another example of such collaboration is the Seoul Declaration, issued by 39
countries and organizations under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 2006. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Sept. 14-15, 2006, Final Seoul Declaration, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 0/14/37463807.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
15. Both of these categories can be seen as examples of variations on shifting income
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The
Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV.
169, 180 (2008). Note that this Article uses "allocation" instead of "apportionment" to
prevent the confusion of tax apportionment with formulary apportionment.
16. See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious
About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REv. 455, 457
(1999) (referring to the deferral privilege as "one of the fundamental features of the U.S.
system for taxing international income").
17. Although there is no objective guideline as to what counts as harmful deferral. See
generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, at 25-36 (1998) (guidance from the OECD on
harmful deferral).
18. Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 16, at 457; see also I.R.C. §§ 951-965 (2006).
19. Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 16, at 462; see also I.R.C. §§ 551-558,
repealed by Pub. L. 108-357, Title IV, Sec. 413(a)(1) (Oct. 22, 2004).
20. Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 16, at 463, 495; see also I.R.C. §§1291-1298
(2006).
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come during the taxable year.2' As international deferral schemes
have become both more common and more creative, such anti-
deferral regimes have become increasingly popular. CFC rules, for
example, originated with the original passage of Subpart F in the
United States in 1962, and they now number well over a dozen in
OECD countries, with the OECD encouraging all member states to
adopt and enforce such rules. 22
Tax avoidance by way of allocation of income occurs when a
taxpayer shifts income or assets to a related taxpayer in another, low-
er-tax, jurisdiction, thereby shifting the taxation of the income or as-
sets to the lower-tax jurisdiction. The best-known example of tax al-
location to avoid or reduce taxation is transfer pricing, pursuant to
which a corporation transfers certain income-producing assets to
another jurisdiction. 23 A further example of avoidance through allo-
cation is thin capitalization, pursuant to which a company develops a
high debt-to-equity ratio due to borrowing beyond its borrowing ca-
pacity and is thus able to take excessive interest deductions. Thin
capitalization, or earnings stripping, rules prohibit such deductions,
21. For example, Company A, a resident of Country A, is a majority shareholder in
Company B, a resident of Country B. Under an extremely simplified anti-deferral regime,
certain shareholders of Company A resident in Country A would be taxed on their pro rata
share of the income earned by Company B in the relevant taxable year. Anti-deferral
regimes, such as Subpart F or the defunct FPHC rules of the United States Internal Revenue
Code (Code), are of course much more complex, but the previous example illustrates the
general concept of anti-deferral regimes.
22. See Peroni, Fleming & Shay, supra note 16, at 492-93; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue 40-
42 (1998) (recommending the adoption of CFC rules).
23. For an illustration of transfer pricing, imagine that Company A and Company B are
related companies and that Country B is a lower-tax jurisdiction compared to Country A.
Company A sells its income-producing assets to Company B, thus shifting the taxes owed on
those assets to the lower-tax jurisdiction. Under a simplified set of transfer pricing rules to
police such activities, Country A would require that the sale of the assets from Company A
to Company B be done on an arm's length basis such that Company B pays the amount for
those assets that an unrelated party would pay in a comparable transaction. For more on
arm's length pricing, see, for example, Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in
the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REv. 133, 148-49 (1999)
(stating that model tax treaties, OECD guidelines and U.S. transfer pricing rules generally
require that tax authorities look at taxpayers in comparable circumstances and comparable
transactions to determine arm's length pricing).
Note that none of the cases discussed herein address transfer pricing, since the
Commission established the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in 2001 and later adopted a
Code of Conduct in 2004. While neither of these regimes prevents the ECJ from considering
a transfer pricing case, they appear to have made such cases less likely. For more on the
Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, see generally Ben J.M. Terra & Peter J. Wattel, European Tax
Law 572-73 (5th ed. 2008).
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either above a certain limit or in the case of borrowing between re-
lated parties. 24
Since the EU consists of twenty-seven different taxing juris-
dictions, Member State residents are faced with numerous opportuni-
ties for tax avoidance. Whether allocating income to different lower-
tax Member States or deferring taxation until income is repatriated
from another Member State, residents of the EU that hope to avoid
taxation have many options available to them. Member States, par-
ticularly those with higher levels of taxation than their neighbors,
have responded by passing numerous anti-avoidance rules and devel-
oping or strengthening anti-avoidance standards. 25 These efforts,
however, are being threatened by recent European Court of Justice
decisions.
Although Member State residents have many opportunities
for tax avoidance, they did not, until recently, necessarily have more
such opportunities than residents of other countries. United States
taxpayers, for example, had the ability to create tax avoidance
schemes both by deferring taxation by shifting income out of the
country and by allocating income and assets both to other countries
and to other states. Whether the tax avoidance in question was being
pursued by a United States or, say, a German taxpayer, the taxpayer's
jurisdiction had the ability to prevent such avoidance by passing an
anti-avoidance rule. Due to recent decisions by the European Court
24. See I.R.C. § 1630). Thin capitalization rules prohibit interest deductions for
interest paid by foreign parent companies if the local subsidiary has a high debt-to-equity
ratio. "The general purpose of ... thin capitalization provisions, which are common in
developed countries, is to prevent tax avoidance. Without such provisions, local subsidiaries
of foreign parents could disguise nondeductible dividends as deductible interest, thereby
shifting a portion of the corporate tax base from the source country to a lower-tax foreign
country." Graetz & Warren, supra note 4, at 1202.
Under simplified thin capitalization rules, deductions taken by Company A for
interest payments to Company B would be disallowed, either partially or wholly, and those
payments from Company A to Company B would be re-characterized as dividends.
Avoidance by way of allocation is a concern both between the states of a federation and
between foreign countries. See Roin, supra note 15, at 204 (referring to the dangers of
factors in the United States' formulary apportionment scheme becoming "open to taxpayer
manipulation"); I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-142 (Sept. 11, 2006) (announcing a $3.4
billion settlement in the transfer pricing dispute with GlaxoSmithKline).
25. One example is Germany's codification of abuse of law in 2008, in which
Germany prohibits "inappropriate legal arrangement." Philip R. West, Antiabuse Rules and
Policy: Coherence or Tower of Babel?, 49 TAx NOTES INT'L 1161, 1171 (2008) (stating that
the German codification "would appear to be similar to the disjunctive version of the
economic substance test as applied in the United States").
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of Justice, however, Member States are no longer as free as other ju-
risdictions to pass anti-avoidance rules. 26
Because of its essential ties to national sovereignty, direct
taxation remains one of the areas over which Member States have re-
sisted ceding authority to the EU and its institutions. Although indi-
rect taxation requires unanimity for harmonization,27 Member States
were willing to devote multiple articles of the EC Treaty to this
area,28 and Member States have been more willing to harmonize indi-
rect taxation from the very start of the integration process. 29 Various
factors may explain the greater willingness of Member States to cede
sovereignty over indirect taxation, including the necessity of harmo-
nized indirect taxation for a common market30 and the role that indi-
rect tax revenue plays in funding the EU. 31 Furthermore, even
though Member States have been more willing to accept the harmo-
nization of indirect taxation, this harmonization has thus far not been
so complete as to include uniform rates. 32 In contrast to indirect tax-
ation, direct taxation falls under only one article of the EC Treaty.
Under Article 94, direct taxation is also subject to unanimity voting
in the Council, but its strong link to Member State sovereignty means
that very few EU measures regulating direct taxation have been pro-
posed. 33
26. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
27. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 93.
28. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 90-93; see also Kaye, supra note 8, at 64
("Although the Treaty specifically covers indirect taxes, Article 293 contains the only
explicit reference to direct taxes and provides that Member States shall enter into
negotiations to eliminate double taxation.").
29. See, e.g., Rossi Q. Marco, An Italian Perspective on Recent ECJ Direct Tax
Decisions, 50 TAX NOTES INT'L 775, 775-76 (2008) (stating that the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the EU, established an ECSC levy in 1951).
30. See European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, How VAT Works,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/taxation/vat/how-vat-works/index-en.htm (last visited
September 14, 2009) (explaining the need to shift from cascade taxes to harmonized indirect
taxes as part of the common market).
31. See Council Directive 2006/112, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1, 8 (EC).
32. See id. 29 (establishing a floor on VAT); id. art. 284(2) (establishing a ceiling on
exemptions).
33. Professor Kaye has noted that "[t]he scope of European direct tax legislation is
limited to a few corporate tax directives, a savings directive, and mutual assistance
directives." Tracy A. Kaye, Europe's Balancing Act: Trends in Taxation, 62 TAX L. REV.
193, 194 (2008). Amongst these regulatory measures is the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,
which "exempts from withholding tax intercorporate dividends and profit shares paid by a
qualifying EU subsidiary to its qualifying EU parent corporation that owns at least 10% of
its stock." Walter Hellerstein, Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, Constitutional Restraints on
Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REv. 1, 14 (2008). See Council Directive 90/435,
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Despite Member State efforts to retain control over direct tax-
ation, one EU institution is not limited by Article 94 in its treatment
of taxation. Although direct taxation is under the purview of Mem-
ber States, this control extends only so far as the limits of Communi-
ty law. In a phrase oft-repeated by the European Court of Justice,
"[a]lthough direct taxation is a matter for the Member States, they
must nevertheless exercise their direct taxation powers consistently
with Community law."' 34 The ECJ thus has the authority to determine
whether Member States are exercising their powers of direct taxation
consistent with Community law, and the court has recently focused
much greater attention on this area. As commentators have noted, di-
rect taxation is now "one of the most important crossroads of Euro-
pean integration, ' 35 with a growing number of cases addressing taxa-
tion in general and direct taxation in particular. 36
1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 (EEC) ("on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of
parent companies and subsidiaries of different member states"), as amended by Council
Directive 2003/123, 2004 O.J. (L 7) 41 (EC) [hereinafter Parent-Subsidiary Directive]. For
more on the direct tax legislation that currently exists, see generally INTRODUCTION To
EUROPEAN TAX LAW ON DIRECT TAXATION (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2008).
Note that the unanimity requirement for direct taxes is more nuanced in certain
respects, with enhanced cooperation now a possibility for certain tax legislation. Under
enhanced cooperation, which is provided for in Article 280d/TFU 329 of the Treaty of
Lisbon, nine or more Member States may move forward in certain legislative areas without
the agreement of other Member States, although unanimity amongst those participating
states is still required. However, the ability of any EU institution to pass direct tax
legislation is also limited by the principle of subsidiarity, which applies to all areas of EU
law and only allows Community action if the objectives of such action cannot be achieved
by individual Member State action. See Kaye, supra, at 193.
34. See, e.g., Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. PLC (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer
(HM Inspector of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695 19. See also, e.g., Case C-347/04, Rewe
Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt K61n-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R 1-02647, 21; Case C-334/02,
Commission v. French Republic, 2004 E.C.R 1-2229, 21; Case C-386/04, Centro di
Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt Miinchen fir K6rperschaften, 2006 E.C.R I-
08203, 15; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1727, 37; Case C-374/04, Test
Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
2006 E.C.R. 1-11673, 36; Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R 1-11753, 35.
35. Pasquale Pistone, The Need for Tax Clarity and the Application of the Acte Clair
Doctrine to Direct Taxes, 35 INTERTAX 534, 534 (2007).
36. One out of eight completed cases in 2006 addressed taxation in general, and one-
third of those cases focused on direct taxation. Id. See also Suzanne Kingston, A Light in
the Darkness: Recent Developments in the ECJ's Direct Tax Jurisprudence, 44 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1321, n.4 (2007) (noting that there were only twenty-six judgments on the
compatibility of national direct tax rules with the fundamental freedoms during the period
from the ECJ's founding through March 2001, but that there were forty-nine such judgments
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Due to the lack of European legislation currently addressing
direct taxation, most direct tax cases before the ECJ raise questions
about direct taxation within the context of freedom of movement,
which protects free movement of workers, 37 freedom of establish-
ment,38 freedom to provide services 39 and free movement of capital. 40
These freedoms are directly applicable, and are therefore automati-
cally guaranteed to citizens of all Member States, without need for
domestic implementing legislation. 41 Neither domestic legislation
nor international agreements may supersede the freedom of move-
ment under EU law,42 and there is no de minimis exception for a re-
striction on one of the freedoms.43 As the ECJ established in Daily
Mail, a citizen of one Member State cannot be restricted in the exer-
cise of these freedoms by either its home state or a host state. 44 In
other words, the ECJ's jurisprudence prohibits any Member State
legislation from distinguishing between that Member State's resi-
dents and similarly situated residents of another Member State.45
from April 2001 through April 2007); Kaye, supra note 4, at 195 (stating that, until mid-
2005, there had been about 100 direct tax cases, with all but seven of these cases striking
down the Member State tax provision in question).
37. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39.
38. Id. art. 43.
39. Id. art. 49.
40. Id, art. 56. In many cases, the freedoms overlap, and the ECJ is asked to consider
whether a measure constitutes a restriction on more than one freedom. See Case C-386/04,
Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt Miinchen fir K6rperschaften, 2006
E.C.R. 1-8203, 24 (noting that all of the freedoms are overlapping). The ECJ's current
approach to such situations is the "centre of gravity" approach, under which the court
considers only the freedom that is primarily affected by the legislation in question, even if
the legislation leads to secondary restrictions on other freedoms. Kingston, supra note 36, at
1324.
Note that while the first three Articles apply only to restrictions on Member States,
Article 56 also prohibits restrictions that affect non-Member State countries. See EC Treaty,
supra note 8, art. 56 (prohibiting "restrictions on the movement of capital between Member
States and between Member States and third countries").
41. Joined Cases C-397/98 & C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1727, 41.
42. See, e.g., Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue,
2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 4.
43. Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministre de I'tconomie, des
Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409, 43 (stating that "a restriction on freedom of
establishment is prohibited by Article 52 of the Treaty even if of limited scope or minor
importance").
44. Case C-81/87, The Queen v. HM Treasury, 1988 E.C.R. 5483. Many direct cases
involve the resident of a Member State invoking the freedoms against his or her home state.
Kingston, supra note 36, at 1327.
45. For more on the ECJ's freedom of movement analysis, see Ruth Mason, Made in
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In analyzing freedom of movement cases, including those ad-
dressing direct taxation, the court generally applies a three-part test.
First, does the national law restrict the applicable freedom of move-
ment or otherwise discriminate? If yes, is there an overriding re-
quirement of general interest that justifies such restriction or discrim-
ination? If yes, does the national legislation ensure achievement of
the aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that pur-
pose?46
In considering the first prong in the context of direct taxation,
the court does not consider issues of tax symmetry but rather focuses
entirely on whether similarly situated taxpayers are treated differently
due to residence-either their own residence or that of related tax-
payers. In cases addressing thin capitalization rules, for example, the
ECJ considers the fact that one subsidiary may deduct interest pay-
ments while another may not to be a sufficient barrier to freedom of
movement to satisfy this first requirement. That the first subsidiary's
parent is a resident taxpayer and the second subsidiary's parent is a
non-resident taxpayer does not lead the ECJ to treat the subsidiaries
as differently situated.47 In other words, the ECJ interprets this prong
broadly, finding discrimination or restriction based on differential
treatment of taxpayers construed liberally to be similarly situated.
It is during consideration of the second prong that Member
States raise prevention of tax avoidance as a justification for a restric-
tive or discriminatory measure. Justifications fall into two catego-
America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1277 (2008);
Ruth Mason, Flunking the ECJ's Tax Discrimination Test, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72
(2007).
46. See, e.g., Case C-105/07, NV Lammers & Van Cleeff v. Belgische Staat, 2008
E.C.R. 1-00173, 25; Case C-231/05, Oy AA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-06373, 44; Case C-347/04,
Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt K6ln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02647, 37; Case C-
524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2007
E.C.R. 1-02107, 64; Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07995, 47; Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey
(HM Inspector of Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 35; Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du
Saillant v. Ministre de l'fconomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409,
49; Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11779,
33.
47. See Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R.
1-11779, 32 ("Such a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies
according to the seat of their parent company constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of
establishment which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 43 EC. The tax measure in
question in the main proceedings makes it less attractive for companies established in other
Member States to exercise freedom of establishment and they may, in consequence, refrain
from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the State which adopts that
measure.").
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ries: those that are enumerated in the Treaty (such as public policy,
public security and public health, enumerated in Article 46) and un-
enumerated objectives relating to the general interest.48 Direct tax
cases challenging freedom of movement have seen a series of com-
mon justifications to defend Member State measures, including pre-
vention of the diminution of tax receipts, maintaining the cohesion of
the tax system, balancing the allocation of taxing rights between
Member States, territoriality, prevention of the double use of losses,
ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and prevention of tax
avoidance. 49 Member States bear the burden of raising justifica-
tions,50 and they will often raise multiple justifications in order to
protect the measure in question.5' The court has accepted prevention
of tax avoidance as a legitimate justification.52
48. See Angelette, supra note 6, at 1219.
49. For justifications that apply in free movement cases other than those dealing with
direct taxation, see Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt
Miinchen fir K6rperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. 1-08203, 43.
50. Case C-522/04, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2007 E.C.R. 1-05701, 48.
51. Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02107, 65; Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey
(HM Inspector of Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837.
Preventing the diminution of tax receipts has been held to be an insufficient
justification. See Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt
Miinchen fiir K6rperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. 1-08203, 59; Case C-196/04, Cadbury
Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07995, 49; Case C-9/02,
Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Minist~re de l'tconomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie,
2004 E.C.R. 1-2409, 60; Case C-436/00, X&Y v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10829,
46. The Advocate General in Cadbury Schweppes suggested that this conclusion follows
logically from the freedom of establishment. Opinion of Mr. Advocate Gen. Lger, Case C-
196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07995, 51.
But see Tom O'Shea, News Analysis: Finland's Intragroup Financial Transfer Rules
Compatible with EU Law, 47 TAX NOTES INT'L 634 (2007) (stating that Court made clear in
Centros that this principle of taxpayers being permitted to choose their jurisdiction for tax
purposes does not extend to situations of fraudulent conduct or tax avoidance).
The court, however, seems to have accepted the possibility that many of the others
could be legitimate justifications if sufficiently limited. See Kingston, supra note 36, at
1347 (stating that the Court has an "extremely restrictive" attitude to justifications).
For cases addressing cohesion (also referred to as fiscal coherence), see Case C-
524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue,
2007E.C.R. 1-02107, 68; Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Stein-
furt, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11779, 40. But see Case C-478/98, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R.
1-0758, 34-35 (not accepting cohesion as a justification). Courts previously required that
there be a direct link between the tax advantage and the tax in question, see, e.g., Joined
Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2001
E.C.R. 1-1727, 69, but the court now seems to be "quietly dropping the requirement that
the tax advantage and levy should relate to the same tax and taxpayer." Kingston, supra note
36, at 1348-49. Kingston states that "no-one is quite sure what is required in order for a
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A measure will only be justified by this rationale, however, if
it is sufficiently narrow to be found proportionate in the third prong
of the three-part test. Although the court does not provide specific
guidance on what is required for a measure to be proportionate to the
Member State's justification, the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine grew out of the principle of proportionality in EU law. Before
the ECJ explicitly applied the three-part framework described above
measure to fall under the justification." Id. at 1348.
For cases addressing balanced allocation, see Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG
v. Finanzamt Koln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02647, 9 41. The interaction of balanced allocation
with other justifications is unclear. Zalasifiski suggests that balanced allocation may only be
a legitimate justification when bundled with other justifications. Adam Zalasihiski, Propor-
tionality ofAnti-Avoidance and Anti-Abuse Measures in the ECJ's Direct Tax Case Law, 35
INTERTAx 310, 320 (2007). In Oy AA, the court suggested that this justification is linked to
prevention of tax avoidance. See O'Shea, supra.
For cases addressing territoriality, see Case C-250/95, Futura Participations & Singer
v. Admin. des contributions, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2471, 9 22. But see Case C-347/04, Rewe Zen-
tralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt Koln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02647, 68 (rejecting territoriality as
a justification).
For cases addressing the double use of losses, see Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in
Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11673,
51-52. This was also a legitimate justification in Marks & Spencer, but it was one of three
justifications, so its independent legitimacy is still unclear. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spenc-
er plc v. David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 51. But see Case
C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt K6ln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02647, 99 45-49
(rejecting the prevention of the double use of losses as irrelevant); Case C-374/04, Test
Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R.
1-11673, T 54 (delineating limit to use of this justification). This justification grows out of
the Community principle of eliminating double taxation. See Council Directive
90/435/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 225). For cases addressing the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
see Case C-250/95, Futura Participations & Singer v. Admin. des contributions, 1997 E.C.R.
1-2471; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cas-
sis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. But see Kingston, supra note 36, at 1351-52 (stating that,
although this justification was accepted in Futura Participations early on, it never succeeds
at protecting a measure through the third step).
52. This perhaps builds on the Community opposition to tax avoidance enshrined in
Council Directive 77/799/EEC (now 92/12/EEC), which encourages information-sharing to
prevent such avoidance. See Council Directive 92/12/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 76); Opinion of
Advocate Gen. Mischo, Case C-436/00, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10829, 9
48-49. See also Zalasifiski, supra note 51, at 316 (stating that prevention of tax avoidance
was legitimized in ICI).
Although accepting prevention of tax avoidance as a justification seems
inconsistent with the court's refusal to accept prevention of diminishing tax receipts, see
MASON, supra note 5, at 110, the court's move here could be understood as requiring
narrower justifications (since the latter justification could apply to many more measures) or
focusing as much on the negative externalities of tax avoidance as on its revenue-lowering
potential.
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to its analysis of alleged restrictions on the fundamental freedoms,
the court arrived at a similar analysis by way of the principle of pro-
portionality. Although the concept of proportionality was established
in Article 5, which limits EU action to that which "is necessary to
achieve the objectives of [the] Treaty," 53 the principle of proportio-
nality developed in the wake of Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ's 1979
judgment that expanded the scope of the EC Treaty from facially dis-
criminatory rules to nondiscriminatory rules that had the effect of
discriminating between Member States.5 4 In exchange for expanding
its power to limit Member State actions under the EC Treaty, the ECJ
allowed Member States to argue that their restrictions were justi-
fied.55 The ECJ only held restrictions to be justified, however, if they
were proportional, and proportionality was determined under a two-
part test, according to which proportionality required that: (i) the re-
striction was appropriate for achieving the Member State's stated ob-
jective and (ii) the restriction was not broader than necessary to
achieve the stated objective (including, in certain cases, an analysis
of whether another less restrictive measure was available). 56 In ap-
plying this test, the court does not provide clear guidance on what
fulfills either of these requirements, instead stating generally that a
measure "must comply with the principle of proportionality, in that it
must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective it
pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. ' '57
In 1998, without explanation for the change, the court shifted
from applying the general principle of proportionality to referring
specifically to wholly artificial arrangements when considering anti-
avoidance cases. In the ensuing decade, the court has applied the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine to eleven anti-avoidance cas-
53. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Long
Shadow of History: Sovereignty, Tax Assignment, Legislation, and Judicial Decisions on
Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the EU, in COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM:
COMPARING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE US SUPREME COURT'S TAX
JURISPRUDENCE 119, 125 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007) ("Article 5 of the EC
Treaty requires respect for subsidiarity and proportionality.") (italics in original).
54. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein
1979 E.C.R. 649.
55. Zalasifiski, supra note 51, at 312.
56. For the sake of clarity, this Article focuses solely on the two-part test. The Court
has also applied a three-part proportionality test that essentially breaks the second prong in
two. Id. at 311-12. For examples of earlier direct tax cases applying the principle of
proportionality, see Case C-478/98, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R. 1-07587 and Case C-
334/02, Comm'n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2229.
57. Case C-478/98, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R. 1-07587, 41.
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es.58 Under the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, the court has
replaced the balancing test inherent in the principle of proportionality
with the requirement that a Member State's anti-avoidance measure
may limit freedom of movement if it applies only to wholly artificial
arrangements. A measure that applies to any transaction or situation
that the court does not deem to be a wholly artificial arrangement is
invalid as an impermissible limitation on the freedom of movement.
The majority of cases in which the court has applied the doc-
trine have led to the disallowance of the Member State anti-
avoidance measure, effectively preventing the Member State from
policing tax avoidance to the extent desired by the domestic legisla-
ture and revenue authority. The phrase "wholly artificial arrange-
ments" first appeared in ICI v. Colmer, which invalidated the United
Kingdom's restriction on the ability of parent companies to take their
subsidiaries' losses into account. 59 Under the United Kingdom's
corporate tax code, such losses could only be used by a parent with a
majority of subsidiaries resident in the United Kingdom. In analyz-
ing whether this provision violated the freedom of establishment, the
Court considered whether the United Kingdom's stated objective of
preventing tax avoidance justified the provision. The court rejected
this claim, stating that it was sufficient to "note that the legislation at
issue in the main proceedings does not have the specific purpose of
preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up to circumvent Unit-
ed Kingdom tax legislation, from attracting tax benefits. ' 60 The ECJ
58. As of August 2008, with two exceptions, the doctrine has only been applied in anti-
avoidance cases. Those two exceptions, Case C-251/06, Firma ING AUER - Die
Bausoftware GmbH v. Finanzamt Freistadt Rohrbach Urfahr, 2007 E.C.R. 1-09689, and
Case C-162/07, Ampliscientifica Srl & Amplifin SpA v. Ministero dell'Economia e delle
Finanze & Agenzia delle Entrate, 2008 E.C.R. 1-04019, both decided within a year of
August 2008, provide further evidence of the establishment of the wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine. Both cases consider secondary legislation-Firma ING A UER
applies Council Directive 69/335/EEC (amended by Directive 85/303/EEC), on capital
duties, while Ampliscientifica applies Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, on VAT-but
both refer to the doctrine as established law. In Firma ING A UER, the court stated that the
scope of the directive in question is not so broad as to protect "the formation of a company
in a Member State under wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic
reality .... " Case C-251/06, 2007 E.C.R. 1-09689, 44. In Ampliscientifica, the court
stated that the abuse of law principle prohibits the directive in question from protecting the
formation of the same. Case C-162/07, E.C.R. 1-4019, 28. Neither case does more than
cite to earlier uses of the doctrine, but they do show that the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine had by August 2008 become sufficiently established to be cited outside of its area
of origination.
59. Case C-264/96, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer
(HM Inspector of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695.
60. Id. 26.
[48:177
TAXA VOIDANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
in ICI rejected the Member State's justification and struck down the
legislation as a violation of freedom of establishment.
This trend continued in five more cases. In Lankhorst-
Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, decided in 2002, the Court
struck down Germany's thin capitalization rules. 61 In 2007, in Rewe
Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt K6ln-Mitte, the Court struck down a
provision of the German corporate tax code that limited the ability of
resident parent companies to take write-downs into account if the
write-downs were associated with a non-resident subsidiary, but not
if the write-downs were associated with a resident subsidiary. 62 The
court added a wrinkle to this habit of using the doctrine to strike
down Member State anti-avoidance rules in three of the cases in
which it found the measure in question to be an impermissible viola-
tion of the freedom of movement. In these cases, the ECJ proposed
changes that would make the measure more likely to survive applica-
tion of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. In Hughes de
Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Minist~re de l'Economie, des Finances et de
l'Industrie, decided in 2003, the court struck down a French tax pro-
vision that taxed residents on latent increases in value when they be-
came non-residents, 63 but suggested that an alternative would be for
the government to "provide for the taxation of taxpayers returning to
France after realizing their increases in value during a relatively brief
stay in another Member State." 64  Other cases in which the court
struck down a measure but suggested ways to modify the measure in
question to ensure that it applied only to wholly artificial arrange-
ments include Europ~enne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA
(ELISA) v. Directeur g~nral des imp6ts et Ministre public65 and
Lammers & Van Cleeff NV v. Belgisch Staat,66 decided in 2007 and
2008, respectively. In ELISA, the court struck down a French law
limiting an exemption from the tax on the commercial value of im-
61. Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11779, 37.
62. Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt Koln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. I-
02647, 52.
63. The provision in question meant that a resident who owned property in France was
taxed on the appreciation of value in that property when the resident moved outside of
France, even if that appreciation was not realized. The provision did not apply to French
residents who stayed within France or non-residents.
64. Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministre de l'Economie, des
Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409, 54.
65. Case C-451/05, Europ~enne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v.
Directeur g~n~ral des imp6ts, Ministre public, 2007 E.C.R. 1-08251.
66. Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeff NV v. Belgische Staat, 2008 E.C.R. I-
00173.
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movable property to persons with centers of management in France
or in Member States that had signed a relevant tax treaty with France.
The court suggested that the measure would have been permitted if
non-residents who were residents of Member States with which
France had not signed a relevant tax treaty were permitted under the
measure to "provide documentary evidence to establish the identity
of their shareholders and any other information which the French tax
authorities consider to be necessary" for the purpose of "demonstrat-
ing that their objective is not that of tax evasion. '67 In Lammers, the
court struck down a Belgian law that reclassified interest payments
above a certain level as a dividend when paid by a resident company
to a non-resident director, but suggested that the law may have been
acceptable if, before reclassifying all interest payments made to non-
resident companies that exceed a certain limit, the measure provided
for a determination of whether the interest being paid was for a loan
granted on an arm's length basis.68
The court has also arrived at the opposite conclusion when
applying the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine and upheld a
domestic anti-avoidance measure as justified and proportional. In Oy
AA, the court upheld the Finnish Law on Intra-Group Financial
Transfers, even after finding that this law was a restriction on free-
dom of movement.69 The court acknowledged the risk that, "by
means of purely artificial arrangements, income transfers may be or-
ganised within a group of companies towards companies established
in Member States applying the lowest rates of taxation or in Member
States in which such income is not taxed. '70 The court found that,
were intra-group transfers deductible even when those transfers
crossed borders, such an arrangement would allow groups of compa-
nies to jurisdiction-shop and choose the Member State in which their
profits would be taxed, regardless of where those profits were gener-
ated.7' Based on this finding, the court held that there was no nar-
67. ELISA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-08251, 98-100.
68. Lammers, 2008 E.C.R. 1-00173, 29-33.
69. Case C-231/05, Oy AA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-06373, 7 33-39. The ECJ currently uses
"wholly artificial arrangements" and "purely artificial arrangements" interchangeably, often
citing to a use of one when defining the other. While it is possible that these two phrases
will come to have different meanings as the doctrine develops, the ECJ's current
jurisprudence provides no reason to believe that this will happen, and this Article therefore
uses "purely artificial arrangements" as a synonym for "wholly artificial arrangements."
Due to the significant disparity in frequency of usage, however, with the ECJ much
preferring "wholly" to "purely," any use of the terms that is not quoting the ECJ directly will
use the term "wholly artificial arrangements" to refer to both phrases.
70. Id. 58.
71. Id. 64.
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rower way of preventing such a situation, and it thus upheld the Fin-
nish Law on Intra-Group Financial Transfers.7 2
Earlier, in Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey,73 the court
also upheld the law in question, but it did so conditionally. In Marks
& Spencer, the court considered the United Kingdom's group tax re-
lief provisions and allowed them to stand only if they met two crite-
ria.74 Although the court presented its decision as upholding the
measure in question, it effectively conditioned this finding by provid-
ing the domestic court with guidance for applying the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine and making a final decision. This deferral
has occurred in the three other anti-avoidance cases in which the
court applied the doctrine. In all three cases in which the court al-
lowed the domestic court to make the final decision, the court has
provided the domestic court with guidelines for determining whether
the measure in question applies only to wholly artificial arrange-
ments. In Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Commissioners of Inland Reve-
nue,75 the ECJ considered the United Kingdom's CFC provisions.
These provisions included a motive test, which exempted parent
companies from the provisions when they could show that the pur-
pose of the transactions in question and the nonresident subsidiaries
were not primarily to reduce the taxes paid to the United Kingdom. 76
Rather than deciding whether the motive test was sufficient to limit
the transactions that the CFC rules targeted to wholly artificial ar-
72. Id. 65-67.
73. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer pic v. David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes),
2005 E.C.R. 1-10837.
74. The Court required that the provisions if they allowed for non-resident subsidiary's
losses being taken into account when the following two criteria were met:
- the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the possibilities available in its
State of residence of having the losses taken into account for the accounting pe-
riod concerned by the claim for relief and also for previous accounting periods,
if necessary by transferring those losses to a third party or by offsetting the
losses against the profits made by the subsidiary in previous periods, and
- there is no possibility for the foreign subsidiary's losses to be taken into ac-
count in its State of residence for future periods either by the subsidiary itself
or by a third party, in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to that third
party.
Id. 55.
75. Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006
E.C.R. 1-07995.
76. The United Kingdom CFC provisions at issue in Cadbury Schweppes were
significantly more complicated than the ECJ suggested in its decision. For a more detailed
description of the provisions, see Simon Whitehead, Practical Implications Arising From the
European Court's Recent Decisions Concerning CFC Legislation and Dividend Taxation, 4
EC TAx REv. 176, 176-78 (2007).
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rangements, the court left the ultimate decision to United Kingdom
courts and provided them with the following criteria:
[I]n order for the legislation on CFCs to comply with
Community law, the taxation provided for by that leg-
islation must be excluded where, despite the existence
of tax motives, the incorporation of a CFC reflects
economic reality.
That incorporation must correspond with an actual es-
tablishment intended to carry on genuine economic
activities in the host Member State ....
As suggested by the United Kingdom Government
and the Commission at the hearing, that finding must
be based on objective factors which are ascertainable
by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent
to which the CFC physically exists in terms of pre-
mises, staff and equipment.
If checking those factors leads to the finding that the
CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any
genuine economic activity in the territory of the host
Member State, the creation of that CFC must be re-
garded as having the characteristics of a wholly artifi-
cial arrangement. That could be so in particular in the
case of a "letterbox" or "front" subsidiary. 77
The court again left the final application of the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine to a national court in Test Claimants in the
Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue
(Thin Cap GLO), in which the court considered several test cases
challenging the United Kingdom's thin capitalization rules prior to
the 1995 amendments and after the 1995 and 1998 amendments. 78
The court stated that the national court should find that the rules were
sufficiently narrow if they met three separate criteria.79 Finally, in
77. Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07995, 65-68. For the domestic court's
finding, see infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
78. After the decision in Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11779, striking
down Germany's thin capitalization rules, a number of claims were brought before United
Kingdom courts by corporations requesting restitution or compensation. As part of this
group litigation, the national court selected certain test cases to refer to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling. The test cases all involved a resident company that was at least 75%
owned by a non-resident parent company and that had been granted a loan either by the
parent company or another non-resident company at least 75% owned by the parent
company.
79. The Court required that the rules: (i) only treated interest payments from a resident
[48:177
TAX A VOIDANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation v. Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue (CFC Test Claimants), the court consi-
dered the United Kingdom's CFC rules after Cadbury and disallowed
the rules unless they met certain requirements. 80 The determination
of whether these criteria were met was left to the national court.
The ECJ's application of the wholly artificial arrangements
thus leads to a variety of outcomes. The holdings of the eleven cases
discussed above are presented visually in the table below:
subsidiary to a non-resident parent company as a distribution when the payments exceed
what the companies would have agreed to on an arm's length basis, (ii) taxed as a
distribution only the proportion of the interest payment that exceeded what would have been
agreed to in an arm's length transaction, and (iii) provided taxpayers with the opportunity to
produce evidence of the commercial justifications for the transaction if the arrangement did
not satisfy the arm's length principle. Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group
Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02107, 80-87. The court stated that
the arm's length principle provided "an objective element which can be independently
verified in order to determine whether the transaction in question represents, in whole or in
part, a purely artificial arrangement, the essential purpose of which is to circumvent the tax
legislation of that Member State." Id. T 81.
80. Twenty-one groups of international companies brought claims challenging the
United Kingdom provisions on dividends and CFCs, and the claims of three of these
groups-Anglo-American, Cadbury Schweppes and Prudential-were selected as test cases.
These test groups claimed that they would not have paid the taxes required under these
provisions or expended the cost required to comply with these provisions had they known
that the provisions were contrary to Community law. Case C-201/05, Test Claimants in the
CFC and Dividend Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2008 E.C.R. 1-02875,
25-30. The court considered other United Kingdom direct tax provisions, but it only applied
the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine in its analysis of the CFC rules. Note that,
because the court had already ruled on an identical question in Cadbury, it issued a reasoned
order, rather than an opinion.
The court order includes discussion of two questions: (i) whether freedom of
movement precludes legislation that provides for the inclusion in the tax base of a resident
company of profits made by a CFC resident in a lower-tax Member State and (ii) whether
freedom of movement precludes compliance requirements when a resident company seeks
exemption from taxes already paid in the non-resident company's Member State of
residence. Id. 70. The Court (i) disallowed CFC rules unless they applied "only to wholly
artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally payable" as determined
by objective factors and (ii) allowed compliance requirements as long as their purpose was
"to verify that the CFC is actually established and that its economic activities are genuine
without that entailing undue administrative constraints." Id. 77 85-86.
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TABLE A: European Court of Justice Anti-Avoidance Cases
Applying the Wholly Artificial Arrangements Doctrine
Court strikes Court leaves the Court upholds
down measure decision to the measure as
national court justified and
proportional
ICI x
Lankhorst- X
Hohorst
Lasteyrie du X(a)
Saillant
Marks & Spencer X(b)
Cadbury X(c)
Thin Cap GLO X(c)
Rewe X
OyAA X
ELISA X(a)
Lammers X(a)
CFC Test X(c)
Claimants
(a) Court proposes changes that would make the measure more likely
to be upheld
(b) Court only upholds measure if it is limited
(c) Court provides specific criteria that national court should
consider
III. PROBLEMS AND PERILS WITH THE WHOLLY ARTIFICIAL
ARRANGEMENTS DOCTRINE
As outlined above, the majority of cases applying the wholly
artificial arrangements doctrine either strike down the challenged
Member State anti-avoidance rule or provide guidelines or conditions
for the application of the doctrine. Rather than allowing the anti-
avoidance rule in question to stand, these cases thus either invalidate
the rule or impose limitations that the Member State had not pre-
viously imposed on itself. Because the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine thus sets the outer limits for permissible anti-avoidance rules
throughout the EU, this Article argues that it is effectively an anti-
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avoidance doctrine or a principle of limitation that applies to domes-
tic anti-avoidance rules. This Part first contextualizes this assertion
by discussing various anti-avoidance doctrines before critiquing the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine along three separate dimen-
sions.
Although the many specific rules discussed in Part II, from
CFC provisions to thin capitalization rules, are becoming more popu-
lar in many jurisdictions, they are not the only tools available to rev-
enue authorities to combat tax avoidance. While courts and revenue
authorities rely on rules to prevent tax evasion, they use a combina-
tion of rules and standards to combat tax avoidance. 81 As tax avoid-
ance becomes progressively more complex and creative, revenue au-
thorities are not always able to preemptively rule on what is or is not
tax avoidance. Judicially created anti-avoidance doctrines fill this
void and allow courts to determine ex post whether a tax avoidance
scheme that may not have been foreseen by the drafters of the reve-
nue code in fact violates the spirit of the code.
To better place the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine in
its proper context, this Part introduces readers to judicially-created
anti-avoidance doctrines. Anti-avoidance doctrines exist apart from
statutory rules and are used by courts to deny tax benefits that arise
from unacceptable avoidance, even when the transaction or arrange-
ment giving rise to these benefits is not prohibited by the letter of the
law. 82 Anti-avoidance doctrines are often used by courts to reinterp-
ret the tax rules as written when the result of those rules would vi-
81. This Article uses the Kaplow definition of rules and standards, pursuant to which
rules are given content ex ante and standards are given content ex post. See Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (defining
rules and standards such that "the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent
to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act")
(emphasis omitted).
82. Anti-avoidance standards include United States common law doctrines such as the
substance over form, step transaction, business purpose, sham transaction and economic
substance doctrines. Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L.
REv. 5, 5 (2000). They also include the now defunct Ramsay principle in the United
Kingdom and the abuse of law principle in certain Member States. See Yitzhak Hadari, Tax
Avoidance in Linear Transactions: The Dilemma of Tax Systems, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
59 (1994) (comparing anti-avoidance doctrines in Israel, the United Kingdom, and the
United States); Nicola Preston, The Interpretation of Taxing Statutes: The English
Perspective, 7 AKRON TAX J. 43, 47-59 (1990) (charting the development and interpretation
of the principle first established in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1982]
A.C. 300 (H.L.), pursuant to which a court can look to the substance of certain transactions
to determine their validity).
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olate courts' sense of the ultimate goal of the tax rules. 83 All judicial
anti-avoidance doctrines essentially play an override function, pur-
suant to which they disregard the statutorily permitted tax benefits
and instead consider the purpose and effect of a transaction to deter-
mine whether those benefits should be allowed. 84 Anti-avoidance
doctrines are thus standards that are created and applied by judges, 85
while anti-avoidance rules, as with all statutes and rules, are created
by legislatures and their application is arguably less dependent on a
judge's discretion.
Two illustrative examples of anti-avoidance doctrines are the
economic substance doctrine in the United States and the abuse of
law principle in the EU. The economic substance doctrine, which
prohibits transactions that would otherwise be permitted under the
Code if those transactions lack economic substance, is one of the
most discussed anti-avoidance doctrines. First applied in 1934,86 this
doctrine continues to spark debate over its definition and scope, with
even the meaning of economic substance undefined. 87 The economic
substance doctrine does not apply to any one specific provision of the
Code. Instead, courts look for economic substance-or lack the-
reof-in a variety of transactions that are covered by a number of dif-
ferent Code provisions. When applying the doctrine in various situa-
tions, courts differ on everything from the definition of economic
substance to the level of tax avoidance permitted'under the Code. 88
83. See David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines,
4 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 94-95 (2002) (describing anti-avoidance doctrines as "standards
that override the otherwise applicable statutory rules"). This Article will not address the
benefit of rules versus standards. For more on that debate in the context of tax law, see
Kaplow, supra note 81, and Weisbach, supra. Kaplow argues that rules should be used
where the law applies frequently.
84. See Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAx REV. 833, 875-77 (2008).
85. Although anti-avoidance doctrines are created by judges and act as the basis for
certain judicial opinions, they are also asserted by litigants once they become accepted parts
of the tax law in a jurisdiction.
86. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
87. See Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA.
TAx REV. 783, 787 (2007-2008) (stating that "[t]he precise structure of the economic
substance doctrine is not settled .... "); see also Sandra Favelukes O'Neill, Let's Try Again:
Reformulating the Economic Substance Doctrine, 121 TAx NOTES 1053, 1053-54 (2008)
(stating that "[t]he historical articulation of the economic substance doctrine demonstrates
that, at its essence, the doctrine is one of purposeful statutory construction").
88. For different courts' applications of the economic substance doctrine, see, for
example, United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001) ("A
'business purpose' does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of tax
considerations."); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the
"inquiry into whether the taxpayer's transactions [have] sufficient economic substance to be
[48:177
TAX A VOIDANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
In contrast to the economic substance doctrine, which applies
solely within the context of taxation, abuse of law is a principle that
originated outside of tax law. In civil law countries, the majority of
Member States, tax avoidance is closely related to-and sometimes
subsumed by-the principle of abuse of law.89 Abuse of law is a civ-
respected for tax purposes turns on both the 'objective economic substance of the
transactions' and the 'subjective business motivation' behind them. However, these distinct
aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step
analysis,' but rather represent related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether
the transaction has sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for
tax purposes.") (citation omitted); Friedman v. Comm'r, 869 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1989);
Sochin v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988); Rosenfeld v. Comm'r, 706 F.2d 1277,
1281 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[A] transaction which is otherwise legitimate, is not unlawful merely
because an individual seeks to minimize the tax consequences of his activities."); Salina
P'ship v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 694 (2000) ("It is well settled that taxpayers
generally are free to structure their business transactions as they please, even if motivated by
tax avoidance considerations."). For more detailed criticism of the economic substance
doctrine, see, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of
Tax, 54 SMU L. REv. 149 (2001); Bankman, supra note 82, at 11; David P. Hariton, Sorting
Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW 235 (1999); Yoram Keinan, The Many
Faces of the Economic Substance's Two-Prong Test: Timefor Reconciliation?, 1 N.Y.U. J.
L. & Bus. 371, 373 (2005); Luke, supra note 87, at 787; O'Neill, supra note 87.
89. It should be noted at the outset that there is an ongoing debate over whether abuse
of law has risen to the level of an actual principle of EU law. Some commentators claim that
it is a concept that is "evolv[ing] towards a general principle of law," Zalasifiski, supra note
51, at 314, while others state that it is unclear both whether it is a "fully fledged principle"
and, if it is, whether that principle applies to Community law or to domestic law throughout
the Community, Rita de la Feria, Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation
of a New General Principle of EC Law Through Tax, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 395, 397-
98 (2008). If it is a principle, it may still be one that is "heavily dependent on the subject
matter at issue," id. at 399, which itself raises the question of whether such an approach is
actually a principle. For an example of different applications based on different contexts,
see id. at 417 (stating that "the case law appears to suggest a divergence of approach by the
ECJ to abuse in cases concerning purely commercial situations, namely those involving legal
persons, from those involving natural persons"). For further discussion on the debate over
whether abuse of law has reached principle status, see id. at 436-39. Feria posits that four
main arguments have been presented in favor of abuse of law not being a principle of
Community law: (i) the Court has never recognized the existence of such a principle, (ii) not
all Member States apply abuse of law in their domestic courts, (iii) there is no precise
Community definition of abuse of law and (iv) the Court is inconsistent in its application of
abuse of law. She then argues, however, that these arguments have been weakened by recent
tax rulings. Id. at 395-98. Since the ECJ recently referred to "the general Community law
principle that abuse of rights is prohibited," Case C-321/05, Kofoed v. Skatteministeriet,
2007 E.C.R. 1-5795 38; see also Case C-255/02, Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Dev. Servs.
Ltd & County Wide Prop. Invs. Ltd v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise, 2006 E.C.R. 1-1609,
68-70, [hereinafter Halifax]. (referring to a "principle of prohibiting abusive practices"),
for purposes of this Article, abuse of law will be treated as a principle. This does not,
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il law concept. 90 The term generally includes avoidance of law in
addition to the much narrower evasion of law, which includes only
fraudulent and illegal actions, but its specific definition may change
depending on the country applying the term.91 It first appeared in EU
law in 1974, with the Court's reference to abusive practice in Van
Binsbergen.92
Abuse of law then made its way into the tax field by way of
indirect taxation in the Halifax case, decided in 2006, which explicit-
ly limited its reasoning to the VAT context. 93 The Court held that the
principle of prohibiting abusive practices applied to VAT, and de-
fined that principle to mean that the "application of Community leg-
islation cannot be extended to cover abusive practices by economic
operators, that is to say transactions carried out not in the context of
normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrong-
fully obtaining advantages provided for by Community law."' 94 The
ECJ then established a two-part test to determine whether an abusive
practice exists:
[I]n the sphere of VAT, an abusive practice can be
found to exist only if, first, the transactions concerned,
notwithstanding formal application of the conditions
laid down by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Di-
rective and the national legislation transposing it, re-
sult in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of
which would be contrary to the purpose of those pro-
visions.
Second, it must also be apparent from a number of ob-
jective factors that the essential aim of the transactions
concerned is to obtain a tax advantage .... [T]he pro-
hibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic
however, mean that this Article considers the scope of this principle or its definition to be
settled. See Marco Greggi, Avoidance and abus de droit: The European Approach in Tax
Law, 6 EJOURNAL OF TAX RESEARCH 23, 36 (2008) (stating that "no iron curtain runs
between use and abuse of law, but rather a thin red line that can shape a different border
when the abuse is tested under commercial law versus tax law").
90. de la Feria, supra note 89, at 395.
91. Greggi, supra note 89, at 33. For history on the concept of abuse of law, see id. at
25-34.
92. de la Feria, supra note 89, at 88 n.] (citing Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria
van Binsbergen v. Vestuur van de Bedrifsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid 1974 E.C.R.
1299).
93. Halifax, supra note 89, 74.
94. Id. 69.
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activity carried out may have some explanation other
than the mere attainment of tax advantages.95
The Court left the decision of whether such an abusive prac-
tice existed to the national court, but it clarified that, when looking to
the second criterion, a national court must "determine the real sub-
stance and significance of the transactions concerned. In so doing, it
may take account of the purely artificial nature of those transactions
and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the
operators involved in the scheme for reduction of the tax burden. '96
In a later case also addressing VAT, the Court clarified that "there
can be a finding of an abusive practice when the accrual of a tax ad-
vantage constitutes the principal aim of the transaction or transac-
tions at issue. '97
In Halifax, therefore, the ECJ established that the principle of
abuse of law applies within the field of indirect taxation, but it did
not have to address whether abuse of law in the Community context
refers to a prohibition on abuse of Community law or a Community-
wide prohibition on abuse of domestic law.98 Amongst commenta-
tors and practitioners, this question-and, in fact, the question of how
to define abuse of law-remains unanswered. Some commentators
are confident that the ECJ's abuse of law focus is at the Community
level 99 and others see a clear divide between abuse of Community
law and abuse of domestic law, 100 while others highlight the overlap
between the concepts.10'
95. Id. 74-75.
96. Id. 81 (emphasis added).
97. Case C-425/06, Ruling, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v. Part Service
Srl., 2008 E.C.R. 1-897 1.
98. See de la Feria, supra note 89, at 397-98 (stating that this aspect of abuse of law is
unclear).
99. Frans Vanistendael, Editorial, Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes: One Single
European Theory ofAbuse in Tax Law?, 15 EC TAX REV. 192, 194 (2006) (opining that "the
ECJ has decided that in the field of income taxation national anti-avoidance or anti-abuse
provisions can only be accepted in a cross-border context when they fight or prevent abuse
of Community law, which is not necessarily the same as abuse of national law").
100. See Zalasifiski, supra note 51, at 314 (stating that "[t]ax avoidance, which appears
in cases of the abusive use of tax provisions, should be distinguished from the abuse of EC
rights").
101. See Greggi, supra note 89, at 37 (That is why the Court plays a fundamental role in
defining the notion and the condition of abuse: defining tax avoidance, it also contributes to
defining the abuse of right by the Member State. In EU law this is particularly true: the
abuse of the taxpayer is counterweighted by the abuse of the Member State; both subjects
are, to a certain extent, in an equal position before the Court. Cadbury is paradigmatic to
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Both the economic substance doctrine and the abuse of law
principle highlight the uncertainty and unpredictability that plague
anti-avoidance standards. They also, however, share the flexibility
and ex post application that characterize these standards and that al-
low them to strike down tax avoidance that might otherwise be per-
mitted in a world of only ex ante anti-avoidance rules. Although the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine applies to anti-avoidance
rules, rather than to transactions, it is in effect similar to many of the
anti-avoidance doctrines discussed above, in that it is a judicially
created standard that is, like all standards, applied and interpreted ex
post. Like other anti-avoidance doctrines, it benefits from flexibility
but can easily be criticized for inconsistency. Unlike other anti-
avoidance doctrines, however, it is not applied by courts in the face
of potential tax avoidance. Instead, it is a supranational principle of
limitation that is applied by the Court to determine the legitimacy of
anti-avoidance rules in the face of potential discrimination or restric-
tion on the fundamental freedoms of the EU. This Part will assess
the impact of this evolving anti-avoidance doctrine from three sepa-
rate perspectives: (i) taxpayers within the EU, (ii) Member States,
and (iii) the EU legal order as a whole.
A. Taxpayers and the Wholly Artificial Arrangements Doctrine
Since the majority of decisions discussed in Part II led to the
invalidation of the Member State anti-avoidance rule in question,
taxpayers engaged in potential avoidance transactions are likely to
favor this new doctrine. For taxpayers engaged in transactions that
are not so egregious as to qualify as "wholly artificial" but that were
previously prevented by domestic anti-avoidance provisions, there-
fore, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine may come as a bless-
this extent. From the UK point of view, the taxpayer is abusing his right to set up an
economic activity abroad, as far as his decision is basically inspired by tax deferral and tax
reduction, and from the taxpayer point of view, the UK is abusing its right to override the
Treaty freedoms. The concept of tax avoidance (and the closely related 'abuse of law')
therefore is at a crossroads the Court had to regulate, potentially catching two pigeons with
one seed.)
For an example of a commentator who considers the Court's approach to abuse of
law to be consistent, see Tom O'Shea, Some ECJ Guidance on Abusive Tax Practices in the
European Union, 50 TAx NOTES INT'L 241 (Apr. 21, 2008) (arguing that Part Service, Thin
Cap GLO and Cadbury Schweppes all exhibit ECJ's consistent approach to abuse of law).
For an example of a commentator who considers the Court's approach to abuse of law to be
inconsistent, see Pistone, supra note 35 (arguing that Halifax, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap
and Kofoed reveal inconsistencies in the Court's approach to abuse of law).
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ing. Despite this, the doctrine still raises three sets of concerns for
taxpayers within the EU.
First, tax avoidance creates negative externalities, 102 but it dif-
fers from other externality-creating behavior in that the economically
ideal level of tax avoidance is zero. 103 In other words, it creates un-
desirable results that affect parties other than the taxpayer (or tax
non-payer, as the case may be) engaged in the avoidance. These un-
desirable results include lower tax revenue, redistribution of wealth
from the government to taxpayers without actual wealth generation,
equity concerns and lack of confidence in the tax system as a
whole. 0 4 Tax avoidance is generally understood to breed disrespect
for the tax system and to lower taxpayer morale. 05 As tax avoidance
increases--or as taxing jurisdictions become less willing or able to
police and prevent such avoidance-taxpayers lose respect for the tax
system. Whereas the effect of anti-avoidance doctrines such as the
economic substance doctrine is to boost taxpayer morale, the effect
of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine is the opposite. Since
the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine limits the ability of Mem-
ber States to prevent tax avoidance, the doctrine has the potential to
increase tax avoidance and thus lower taxpayer morale. As taxpayers
lose respect for the tax system, they arguably become more likely to
find ways to themselves avoid taxation, as well as becoming other-
wise disengaged.
Second, avoidance reduces revenue. The creation of a doc-
trine that may lead to more tax avoidance threatens the ability of
Member States to raise revenue and shape fiscal policy. As consum-
ers of services funded by tax revenues, therefore, Member State tax-
payers may be harmed by the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.
102. Edgar, supra note 84, at 833. Although tax avoidance differs from more traditional
negative externalities, thinking of it as such emphasizes its actual social costs, which will be
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
103. Id. at 864 (stating that "there is no level of tax-avoidance behavior that
policymakers should accept"). Note that although an economically ideal level of tax
avoidance would be zero, such a level is logistically and politically impossible.
104. Alexandra M. Walsh, Note, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax
Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2001).
105. See, e.g., Dept. of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:
Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals (1999), (Section IV noting that tax shelters
"breed disrespect for the tax system-both by those who participate in the tax shelter market
and by others who perceive unfairness"); Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th
Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (H.R. 4961, Public Law 97-218) (Comm. Print 1982), 17 (stating
that one purpose for passing the alternative minimum tax was that "the ability of high-
income individuals to pay little or no tax undermines respect for the entire tax system").
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Finally, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine as it cur-
rently exists is plagued by ambiguity and unpredictability. 10 6 Just as
with anti-avoidance doctrines such as the economic substance doc-
trine and the abuse of law principle, 10 7 the inconsistencies of the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine lead to unpredictability,
meaning that taxpayers are left without guidance as to the effect of
the doctrine on their own tax burden. In none of the cases described
in Part II does the Court define what constitutes a wholly artificial ar-
rangement; it instead raises more questions than it answers. Is a
wholly artificial arrangement determined by objective economic sub-
stance, subjective intent to avoid taxation, or a combination of the
two?' 08 Do wholly artificial arrangements only occur in tax evasive
or fraudulent transactions, or do they also occur in tax avoidance
106. From the perspective of taxpayers, such unpredictability may not necessarily be
enough of a problem to offset the fact that the doctrine limits the ability of Member States to
police tax avoidance. Unpredictability does create more transaction costs for taxpayers
structuring transactions, however, and is thus a problem inherent in the doctrine, even if
these costs do not outweigh the benefits of a more permissive tax environment.
107. See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
108. This confusion may originate partly in the court's abuse of law jurisprudence and
partly in the court's response to the opinion of Advocate-General Leger that preceded the
court's opinion by four months. See Case C-196/04, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General
Lger, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995. In tying
the analysis of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine in his opinion to both the abuse of
law principle and the purposes behind the Treaty protection of freedom of establishment,
Advocate-General Lager arrived at a determinative question: "whether there is a wholly
artificial arrangement intended to circumvent national tax legislation in a parent company's
relationship with a CFC" depends on "whether the subsidiary is genuinely established in the
host State and carries on its activities in that State with regard to the services provided to the
parent company, the payment for which has resulted in a tax reduction by that company in
the State of origin." Id. T 110. Lrger proposed a three-part test, based on suggestions from
the United Kingdom and the Commission, to determine whether a subsidiary satisfies the
requirement of genuine establishment: "First, the degree of physical presence of the
subsidiary in the host State, secondly, the genuine nature of the activity provided by the
subsidiary and, finally, the economic value of that activity with regard to the parent company
and the entire group." Id. 111. All three of these criteria would be determined "only on
the basis of objective factors." Id. 117. See also id. 115 (rejecting the "parent
company's avowed purpose of obtaining a reduction of its taxation in the State of origin" as
a criterion). The court, however, did not adopt the three-part test and instead focused
entirely on "objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in
particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and
equipment" in determining the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement. Cadbury
Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07995, 67. Furthermore, the
court stated that such a wholly artificial arrangement required both "a subjective element
consisting in the intention to obtain a tax advantage" and "objective circumstances showing
that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by Community law, the
objective pursued by freedom of establishment ... has not been achieved." Id. 64.
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transactions? 0 9 In other words, are Member States permitted to pre-
vent anything other than purely fraudulent transactions in the wake of
the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine? Finally, is it possible
that the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine is not entirely limited
to wholly artificial arrangements?"I 0
109. This uncertainty may arise partially out of the uncertainty over what constitutes
abuse of law. The EU as a whole lacks an agreement on the line between acceptable and
unacceptable tax avoidance, and the court has continued this confusion by blurring the line
between tax avoidance and tax evasion in its development of the wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine. Although the European Council noted in 1975 the importance of
combating international tax evasion and tax avoidance, see Council Resolution of 10
February 1975 on the measures to be taken by the Community in order to combat
international tax evasion and avoidance, Council Resolution of 10 February 1975, 1975 O.J.
(C 35) 1, 2, and the European Commission has focused in a recent communication on the
problem of tax evasion, see Provisional communication of 26 October 2005 (cited in Paulus
Merks, Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning, 34 INTERTAx 273, 277 n. 42 (2006)),
the EU lacks a definition of tax avoidance or a clear line between what level of tax
avoidance beyond tax evasion is acceptable. Id. at 277. Note that the Ruding Committee, a
committee of experts convened by the European Commission, did provide a broad definition
of tax avoidance, but this seems not to have been picked up by EU institutions, particularly
the ECJ. See id. at 278. Tax avoidance and tax evasion are generally understood to be
distinct concepts. Tax evasion refers to illegal activity, "which entails breaking the law and
which moreover can be shown to have been taken with the intention of escaping payment of
tax." Id. at 273. Tax avoidance, in contrast, includes all efforts by taxpayers to reduce their
tax burden and can include both acceptable avoidance and unacceptable avoidance. Id. at
273-74. For the purposes of this Article, unacceptable tax avoidance is that level of tax
avoidance beyond pure fraudulent tax evasion that a taxing jurisdiction determines to be
unacceptable. One example of tax avoidance, in contrast to tax evasion, could include
transactions that obey the letter of the law but are structured so as to reduce taxation to an
extent prohibited by the overarching purposes of the tax law. In Lankhorst-Hohorst, 2002
E.C.R. 1-11779, the Court treated tax avoidance and tax evasion as interchangeable. In
ELISA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-08251, the Court alternated between distinguishing between them and
conflating them. In Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, the Court resorted to general
references to abuse of law rather than clarifying exactly how much tax avoidance beyond tax
evasion-if any-Member States are permitted to police.
110. The Court added to the confusion over the definition of wholly artificial
arrangements when it suggested in one case that perhaps the doctrine does not require
domestic anti-avoidance provisions to target only wholly artificial arrangements. In Oy AA,
2007 E.C.R. 1-06373, the Court suggested that a measure could be proportionate to the
justification of preventing tax avoidance even if it was not only meant to target wholly
artificial arrangements. The Court in Oy AA appears to have broadened the range of
domestic provisions that may withstand scrutiny under the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine. By stating that a measure intended to prevent tax avoidance may be permissible
even if it is intended to target more transactions than wholly artificial arrangements created
to avoid taxation, the Court suggested that such a measure could survive application of the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. No later judgment has supported this view,
however, so the scope of the doctrine-and the anti-avoidance rules that it encompasses-
remains unclear to taxpayers.
2010]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
Despite this uncertainty, taxpayers do have reason to believe
that the effect of the doctrine is to allow more tax positions than were
previously permitted under Member State anti-avoidance rules, since
the doctrine has been used to strike down multiple such rules. The
Court has used the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine to strike
down rules limiting the use of losses and write-downs by parent
companies based on the residence of subsidiaries,"' thin capitaliza-
tion rules that applied to interest paid to foreign shareholders or di-
rectors, 12 exit taxes,1 13 and rules that limited exemptions on immov-
able property tax based on residence or treaty status. 114 The Court
has permitted group tax relief rules limiting use of losses only if the
limitations allow the use of foreign subsidiaries' losses if those for-
eign subsidiaries have exhausted all other options. 115 The only rule
that the Court has allowed to stand unconditionally is the Finnish an-
ti-avoidance rule limiting deductible intragroup financial transfers
based on residence. 116
Despite the many ambiguities surrounding the doctrine, inter-
nal inconsistency is not necessarily a death knell for a doctrine still in
its early stages. Courts in many jurisdictions first establish flexible
judicial standards to address new legal issues that are so complex as
to require input from other governmental entities, 117 and anti-
avoidance provisions are sufficiently complex to require a flexible
approach by the European Court of Justice. Furthermore, given the
difficulty of reconciling Member States' reserved sovereignty over
direct taxation with the ECJ's jurisdiction over all free movement
cases, including those involving direct taxation, an inconsistent doc-
trine may be the best possible response. As will be shown in Parts
III.B and III.C below, however, the doctrine raises significant con-
111. See Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (HM
Inspector of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695; Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v.
Finanzamt Ko1n-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R 1-02647.
112. Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeff NV v. Belgische Staat, 2008 E.C.R. I-
00173; Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11779
113. Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Minist~re de l'Economie, des
Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409.
114. Case C-45 1/05, Europ&enne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v.
Directeur g~n~ral des imp6ts and Minist~re public, 2007 E.C.R. 1-0825 1.
115. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes),
2005 E.C.R. 1-10837.
116. Case C-231/05, Oy AA 2007 E.C.R. 1-06373.
117. The treatment by Delaware courts of takeover law in the 1980s is an example of
this approach. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588,
626-27 (2003) (referring to the fact that the "mid-1980s court decisions zigzagged").
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cerns for Member States and the EU legal order as well, and these
concerns highlight the need for the involvement of the other institu-
tions of the EU and the Member States in reaching a solution.
B. Member States and the Wholly Artificial Arrangements
Doctrine
The uncertainty and ambiguity created by the wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine do not only affect taxpayers. Since the wholly
artificial arrangements doctrine sets the limit for anti-avoidance rules
in all Member States, the doctrine also affects Member State courts
and legislatures. Domestic courts are forced to interpret domestic an-
ti-avoidance rules in the context of the ECJ's doctrine, and Member
State legislatures must amend or repeal anti-avoidance rules they
otherwise would have retained.
On the judicial front, the effect of the confusion surrounding
the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine can be seen most clearly
in the effort of courts other than the European Court of Justice to
grapple with the precedent set by the Court. On July 27, 2007, the
United Kingdom Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the In-
come Tax Act (Special Commissioners) held in Vodafone 2 v. Reve-
nue and Customs Commissioners1 8 that the CFC legislation chal-
lenged in Cadbury Schweppes could be read as compatible with the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. Vodafone 2, which was filed
before the ECJ's decision in Cadbury Schweppes, addressed the
United Kingdom's CFC rules, 19 and the Special Commissioners had
referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, also prior to
Cadbury Schweppes.120 In their ruling of July 2007, the Special
118. Vodafone 2 v. Revenue and Customs Comm'rs, 2008 EWHC (Ch) [1569]
[hereinafter Vodafone 2 1].
119. Note that these were the same rules as were challenged in Cadbury Schweppes.
Although the United Kingdom had amended these rules by the time of the Vodafone 2 I
ruling, see infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text, the pre-reform rules were the ones at
issue in this case.
120. Vodafone 2 I, supra note 118, 1. Cases regarding direct taxation have arrived
before the ECJ in one of two ways: pursuant to Article 226 or Article 234. Article 226
provides for the Commission to bring an action against a Member State that it considers to
have failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 226.
Before the Commission may bring such an action, the Commission must notify the Member
State and issue a reasoned opinion on the matter. Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98,
Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue and HM Attorney General, 2001
E.C.R. 1-1727, 38. Article 234 provides for national courts to refer cases to the ECJ for
preliminary rulings. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 234. Under Article 234, a national court
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Commissioners considered the effect of Cadbury Schweppes on the
Vodafone 2 reference for a preliminary ruling. The two Special
Commissioners agreed on the following definition of wholly artificial
arrangements:
'Wholly artificial arrangements' as that term is used in
the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes are such ar-
rangements intended solely to escape tax charged by
the Member State where the parent company is resi-
dent (in this case, the UK) and, in addition to the sub-
jective element consisting in the intention to obtain a
tax advantage, exhibiting objective circumstances
showing that, despite formal observance of the condi-
tions laid down by Community law, the objective pur-
sued by freedom of establishment . . . has not been
achieved and the arrangements do not reflect econom-
ic reality.'2 1
Their agreement ended there, however, with one Special
Commissioner, Mr. Walters, arguing that the motive test could be
read as restricted to wholly artificial arrangements 22 and the other
Commissioner, Mr. Wallace, arguing that it could not. 2 3 The Special
can only refer a case to the ECJ if the interpretation of EU law is necessary for a decision in
the case. Id. The ECJ has ruled, however, that a national court may refer a hypothetical
situation for a preliminary ruling if an action is pending before the Court and the ECJ has all
the information necessary for a preliminary ruling. Case C-436/00, Opinion of Advocate
General Mischo, X and Y v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10829, 9 17-19. Any national
court may refer a case for a preliminary ruling if it meets the requirements of Article 234,
but a court of last resort must refer such a case. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 234. The vast
majority of ECJ direct tax cases have arrived at the Court under Article 234 rather than
Article 226. Kingston, supra note 36, at 1322 n.4 (stating that 41 of the 49 ECJ cases
addressing direct taxation and freedom of movement between April 2001 and April 2007
were Article 226 proceedings).
121. Vodafone 2 I, supra note 118, 15. Note that both Commissioners agree with this
interpretation. See id. T 80 (stating that Mr. Wallace "is in agreement with the Decision up
to paragraph 67, but he parts company at that point").
122. Id. 99 69-72.
123. Id. 9 73-80. The Special Commissioners summarized their disagreement as
follows:
Mr. Waiters considers that a restriction in the application of the motive test as
defined in the CFC legislation to its application only to wholly artificial ar-
rangements can be "read down" into s.748(3) ICTA as a matter of conforming
interpretation, and the result would not be inconsistent with the scheme or
'grain' of the motive test as so defined to be to serve as part of the legislative
mechanism in place to ensure that the CFC legislation is not applicable in situa-
tions which are not abusive (or, put positively, to ensure that the CFC legisla-
tion is only applicable in abusive situations). Mr. Wallace, on the other hand,
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Commission thus only reached its interpretation based on a procedur-
al rule that gave the former Commissioner a deciding vote.12 4
Vodafone 2 was appealed to the High Court of Justice (Chan-
cery Division), which overturned the Special Commissioners on July
4, 2008.125 The High Court found that it is "impossible to construe
[the CFC provision] so as to make it conform with the right of free-
dom of establishment under Article 43"126 and dismissed HMRC's
inquiry into Vodafone's tax return. 127 These opposite holdings, as
well as the lower court's internal disagreements, suggest that the de-
finition of a wholly artificial arrangement is opaque even to the
courts that the ECJ expects to apply the doctrine.
On the legislative front, along with striking down provisions
such as those in ICI, Lankhorst-Hohorst, Lasteyrie, Rewe, ELISA,
and Lammers, the doctrine has the effect of leading Member States to
amend or eliminate domestic provisions that were previously used to
police tax avoidance. Although application of the doctrine does not
always lead to the immediate defeat of an anti-avoidance provision,
the mere existence of the doctrine has led Member States to change
their approach to policing anti-avoidance measures. Just as anti-
avoidance doctrines are often understood to affect the tax planning of
taxpayers aiming to escape audit or challenge, the wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine has led Member States to alter their anti-
avoidance rules even before they could be challenged under the de-
veloping doctrine.
On December 10, 2007, the European Commission issued a
communication in response to Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap
takes the view that, although a provision restricting the CFC legislation to
wholly artificial arrangements would not be inconsistent with the basic purpose
of the CFC legislation, the European Court in Cadbury Schweppes did not en-
visage reading into the motive test a restriction which is wholly absent from
that test as defined in the legislation.
Id. 83-84.
124. Id. 108 (referring to reg. 18(2) of the Special Commissioners (Jurisdiction and
Procedure) Regulations, 1994, SI 1994 No. 1811). Reg. 18(2) provides, "Where proceedings
are before a Tribunal which comprises two Special Commissioners, in the event of an
equality of votes, the Special Commissioner presiding at the hearing shall be entitled to a
second or casting vote." Reg. 18(2), SI 1994 No. 1811.
125. Vodafone 2 v. Revenue & Customs Comm'rs, [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1569
[hereinafter Vodafone 2 II].
126. Id. 39.
127. Id. 90. ("In my judgment the CFC legislation, which depends on section 747 and
section 748 for its effectiveness, must be disapplied so that, pending such amending
legislation or executive action, no charge can be imposed on a company such as Vodafone
under the CFC legislation. It follows that HMRC's enquiry into Vodafone's tax return for
the accounting period has no legitimate purpose and should be closed.").
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GLO. 128 In this document, the Commission stated that, in light of the
ECJ's recent decisions, "there is an urgent need (i) to strike a proper
balance between the public interest of combating abuse and the need
to avoid disproportionate restrictions on cross-border activity within
the EU; and (ii) for better coordination of the application of anti-
abuse measures in relation to third countries in order to protect
[Member States]' tax bases."'1 29 This communication acknowledged
that the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, as developed in the
Court's decisions, would have "implications for [Member States]' tax
systems"'130 and encouraged Member States to undertake a general
review of their anti-avoidance rules and to work with the Commis-
sion to "promote a better understanding" of these implications. 131
In response to the ECJ's new doctrine and the Commission's
encouragement, many Member States have changed domestic direct
tax measures that were otherwise not under review. In other words,
the creation of the doctrine has forced Member States to rewrite di-
rect tax provisions for reasons other than revenue demands or
changes in fiscal policy. In Italy, the legislature responded to Lank-
horst-Hohorst by limiting Italy's thin capitalization rules, enacted in
2004, to only apply domestically. 132 After Cadbury Schweppes,
Denmark announced plans to amend its CFC rules, 133 Sweden
changed its CFC rules, 134 and Germany limited the application of its
CFC rules.135
128. European Commission, The Application of Anti-Abuse Measures in the Area of
Direct Taxation-Within the EU and in Relation to Third Countries, COM (2007) 785 final
(Dec. 10, 2007) [hereinafter COM(2007)]; (stating that Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap
GLO "were largely responsible for the commission's decision to release the December 10
communication").
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id.
132. See Marco, supra note 29.
133. Jens Wittendorff, Denmark to Change CFC Rules, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Oct. 4,
2006, Doc 2006-20662, available at LEXIS, 2006 WTD 192-2 (stating that the existing
Danish CFC rules were "not confined to wholly artificial arrangements created to escape the
tax normally due on profits generated by activities carried out in Denmark").
134. Peter Sundgren, Swedish CFC Taxation and the 'Business Purpose' Concept, 50
TAx NoTEs INT'L 133 (2008). Sundgren argues that this requirement "corresponds broadly.
. with the so-called business purpose doctrine developed mainly in common-law countries."
Id. Under the new rules, a CFC must have its own physical premises, equipment, personnel
and "day-to-day operations [must] be carried out independently ... without the influence or
involvement of staff from the CFC's parent company or any other company within the
business group." Id. In passing these rules, legislators debated whether the requirement of a
"real establishment engaged in genuine business operations" conformed to the wholly
artificial arrangements doctrine as defined in Cadbury Schweppes. Id. Although the
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As the Member State whose anti-avoidance legislation was
called into question by the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppes, the United
Kingdom was the most immediately responsive Member State to the
Court's anti-avoidance jurisprudence. The Court in Cadbury
Schweppes did not determine whether the motive test in the United
Kingdom's CFC rules was sufficient to limit the rules' application to
wholly artificial arrangements and instead left that determination to
United Kingdom domestic courts. While commentators asserted that
the motive test defined tax avoidance more broadly than would the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, 36 the difference between the
UK's existing CFC regime and EU law remained in question while
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) set about reforming the existing
legislation before the decision of the High Court of Justice deter-
mined the legitimacy of the previous CFC rules. 137 In June 2007,
HMRC issued a discussion document that addressed reform of the
CFC rules, among other items.1 38 In order to escape a tax penalty
Swedish government argued that the new rules accurately reflect the requirements of EU law
after Cadbury Schweppes, at least one commentator has argued that the Swedish law defines
tax avoidance much more broadly than does the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. Id.
135. Jan Becker et al., Impact of ECJ's Cadbury Schweppes Decision on German Tax
Planning, 45 TAX NOTES INT'L 879 (2007). On January 8, 2007, the German Ministry of
Finance issued a binding decree pursuant to which Germany's CFC rules will not apply to a
subsidiary in the European Economic Area (EEA) that: (i) "carr[ies] out business activities
in the country of the subsidiary's residence on a regular basis," (ii) employs "sufficient
managing and supporting staff' that is "appropriately skilled" and can "perform the
subsidiary's tasks independently," (iii) earns its income "through activities carried out by the
company itself', and (iv), in cases in which its revenue is "predominantly from related-party
transactions," provides a service that generates value for the related person and has capital
funding appropriate to the value being added. Although Germany intended this amendment
to comply with the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, commentators have suggested
that the amended CFC rules still define tax avoidance too broadly. See id. ("It is doubtful
that the decree's business activity test is in full compliance with ECJ jurisprudence");
Whitehead, supra note 76, at 181 (arguing that the amended rules' focus on the existence of
workers is broader than the ECJ's requirement of fictitious arrangements).
Although the anti-avoidance rules of all Member States are subject to the wholly
artificial arrangements doctrine, not all Member States changed their rules in response to the
ECJ's jurisprudence. This may be due partially to the fact that some Member States did not
have similar rules to those challenged before the ECJ, see generally Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global
Issue (1998) (advocating the adoption of anti-avoidance rules for those OECD member state
countries that did not have them), and partially to the fact that some Member States are less
compliant. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., David Taylor & Laurent Sykes, Controlled Foreign Companies and
Foreign Profits, 5 BRIT. TAX REV. 609, 612 (2007).
137. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
138. West, supra note 25 at 1170 (stating that "the consultation document is widely
2010]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
under the proposed new rules, a CFC must have a "business estab-
lishment" in an EEA territory, as well as individuals who "work for"
the CFC in the territory during the period in question and "net eco-
nomic value" from activities arising from labor, not capital. 139 This
reform has been critiqued as an insufficient response to Cadbury
Schweppes that still defines tax avoidance more broadly than does the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.140
Even those Member States that have not voluntarily consi-
dered their own anti-avoidance strategies have felt the effects of the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine on their direct tax authority.
In February 2008, the Commission sent Spain a reasoned opinion re-
questing that it amend its anti-abuse rules. 141 Under Article 226, this
reasoned opinion is the first step in a process that could culminate
with the Commission referring the case to the ECJ if Spain does not
make the requested amendments. 142 Together, these responses high-
light the very real impact that the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine is having on Member States' ability to exercise their chosen
level of discretion in policing tax avoidance to the extent. As will be
discussed in Part III.C, these legislative responses raise concerns for
both Member State sovereignty and the future of EU law.
viewed as the government's response to Cadbury Schweppes"). See also id. at 1171 n.81
(stating that "[i]t is understood that HMRC coordinated closely with the IRS in drafting the
consultation document").
139. Taylor & Sykes, supra note 136, at 620-24. Taylor and Sykes distinguish the
requirements for section 751A to apply from those laid out by the ECJ in Cadbury
Schweppes. See id. at 620.
140. See id. at 614 (stating that the UK government's "response to the Cadbury
Schweppes judgment reflects a denial that there is... a gap" between passive mobile income
and income from wholly artificial arrangements). See also id. at 628 (arguing that "section
75 1A is an inadequate response to Cadbury Schweppes"); Peter Nias & James Ross, United
Kingdom Makes Minimal Changes to CFC Rules, WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY, Dec. 22, 2006,
Doc 2006-25439, available at LEXIS, 2006 WTD 246-2 (suggesting that the UK
government's response to both Cadbury Schweppes and Marks & Spencer has been to see
the decisions as-incorrectly--just requiring "a few minor tweaks required to remove any
ambiguity").
141. Press Release, European Union, Corporate Taxation: Commission Requests Spain
to Amend Discriminatory Anti-Abuse Rules (Feb. 28, 2008). The anti-abuse rules in
question include tax treatment of dividends distributed by companies established in certain
Member States or territories of the EU, CFC rules and provision regarding non-deductibility
of depreciation.
142, See id.
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C. The EU Legal Order and the Wholly Artificial Arrangements
Doctrine
As shown by their different approaches to amending domestic
anti-avoidance rules, Member States themselves are not certain of the
effect of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. To the extent
that there is any Member State agreement on the doctrine, however, it
is that the doctrine is excessively restrictive. During the hearing in
Rewe, the German government stated that it believed the "specific
objective of the counteraction of purely artificial arrangements to be
unduly restrictive" and requested that the case law of the Court in this
area be relaxed.' 43 The government argued that Member States must
have the ability to "enact general measures of principle, designed to
counteract tax avoidance and to adopt abstract and general regula-
tions targeted at specific avoidance schemes."' 44  The Court ac-
knowledged the government's concerns but then moved directly to its
application of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine nonethe-
less. Although the scope of a wholly artificial arrangement is still
undefined, Rewe shows that Member States fear that the definition is
far narrower than the unacceptable tax avoidance that their legislation
previously punished.
From the point of view of Member States, the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine is problematic not just because of its in-
ternal inconsistencies but also because of the limitations it poses to
their sovereignty and their ability to operate an effective tax system,
itself at the core of nationhood. As discussed at the start of Part II,
the Member States of the EU face many challenges in the form of tax
avoidance. Along with the many domestic tax avoidance schemes
that all nations face, Member States, particularly the higher-tax juris-
dictions in the EU, face concerns about deferral and allocation.
Member States have responded to these concerns by following the
lead of the United States and the advice of the OECD and passing a
number of anti-avoidance rules, including provisions applying to
CFCs, thin capitalization, and group relief. In keeping with an inter-
national trend, Member States have been moving in the direction of
strengthening their anti-avoidance regimes. 145 The Court's develop-
143. Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt Ktln-Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. I-
02647 50, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:62004J0347:EN:HTML.
144. Id.
145. See generally West, supra note 25 (discussing efforts by Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States to prevent tax avoidance). One example is
Germany's codification of abuse of law in 2008, in which Germany prohibits "inappropriate
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ment of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, however, has
thwarted these Member State efforts to police tax avoidance. After
the rulings discussed in Part II, Member States can no longer main-
tain anti-avoidance rules similar to those in ICI, Lankhorst-Hohorst,
Lasteyrie due Saillant, Rewe, ELISA, and Lammers, nor can they
maintain anti-avoidance rules similar to those in Cadbury Schweppes,
Thin Cap GLO, or CFC Test Claimants if those rules apply to trans-
actions other than wholly artificial arrangements. Member States are
constrained in their ability to pass CFC and thin capitalization rules,
both of which are common in jurisdictions outside the EU. They are
prevented from passing limitations on group losses that differentiate
based on the residence of the majority of subsidiaries, 146 thin capita-
lization rules that apply to all non-resident parent corporations, 147 de-
parture taxes that apply to all residents moving out of the jurisdic-
tion, 148 and limitations on property tax exemptions that apply only to
residents of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions that had signed a relevant
tax treaty. 149 While some of these impermissible rules, such as the
property tax exemption limitation in ELISA, may be explicitly dis-
criminatory, others, such as thin capitalization rules and CFC rules,
are common anti-avoidance rules in other jurisdictions that are gen-
erally considered not to be discriminatory under the nondiscrimina-
tion concept applied by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development.15 0
legal arrangements." Id. at 1171 (stating that the German codification "would appear to be
similar to the disjunctive version of the economic substance test as applied in the United
States").
146. See Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (HM Inspector
of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695; Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v Finanzamt K61n-
Mitte, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02647.
147. See Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R.
1-11779; Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeff NV v. Belgisch Staat, 2008 ECR 1-00173.
148. See Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Minist~re de l'Economie, des
Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2409.
149. See Case C-451/05, Europ~enne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA
(ELISA) v. Directeur g~n~ral des imp6ts and Minist~re public, 2007 E.C.R. 1-08251.
150. Although the norms created by the OECD do not necessarily inform the institutions
of the EU, its role as an international organization with both tax expertise and overlapping
membership with the EU means that many EU Member States look to the OECD for fiscal
guidance.
Readers should note that the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine only limits an-
ti-avoidance rules that apply across borders. Member States are still free to pass anti-
avoidance rules that apply only to their citizens within their borders and that do not in any
way affect freedom of movement. Such rules would not, however, have any effect on inter-
national tax avoidance. Given the growing problem of cross-jurisdictional tax avoidance,
see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition:
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The creation of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine
thus directly contradicts the unanimity requirement of Article 94. De-
spite the fact that no EU institution has the authority to legislate in
the area of direct taxation without the support of all twenty-seven
Member States, the European Court of Justice is using this new doc-
trine to curtail Member State authority over just this area. As the
need for anti-avoidance legislation increases, Member States are be-
ing prevented from passing such legislation in the form that they
choose due to both the actual application of the wholly artificial ar-
rangements doctrine and the specter of litigation leading to such ap-
plication. The wholly artificial arrangements doctrine effectively
creates a vacuum in which Member States are not permitted to pass
certain anti-avoidance provisions, but no EU institution yet has the
authority to pass any EU-wide anti-avoidance doctrine. Due to this
judicially created principle of limitation, the Member States of the
EU are thus more open to tax avoidance than they would be as com-
pletely independent nations.
Furthermore, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine al-
lows Member States to fully police tax avoidance outside the EU, but
not within the EU. Further, because freedom of movement only ap-
plies within the EU, the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine only
limits the application of anti-avoidance rules within the borders of the
EU. 151 In other words, while a Member State is free to punitively tax
the owners of a CFC in, say, the United States, the same Member
State cannot impose the same punitive tax on an identical CFC in
Ireland, despite the latter's recognized use as a tax haven. 152
These restrictions on Member State sovereignty are not unex-
pected. As many commentators have reflected, complete Member
State sovereignty over direct taxation and complete integration can-
not coexist.1 53 Although the impossibility of reconciling these two
An Emerging Global Issue 25-36 (1998). Member States in recent decades have been in-
creasing-in both strength and number-just those rules that implicate the wholly artificial
arrangements doctrine.
151. See Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (HM Inspector
of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695. See also Pasquale Pistone, Taxation of Cross-Border
Dividends in Europe: Building Up Worldwide Tax Consistency, 62 TAX L. REv. 67, 70
(2008).
152. See Press Release, The White House, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax
Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office.
153. See, e.g., Joann Martens Weiner, Practical Aspects of Implementing Formulary
Apportionment in the European Union, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 634-35 (2007) ("Broadly
speaking, the ECJ has such a strong influence on EU company tax rules because it takes a
different view of company tax policy than do the individual Member States. The ECJ's goal
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goals is often acknowledged, the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine highlights this impossibility for Member States. If Member
States can no longer police tax avoidance-which poses a major
threat to raising revenue-they no longer have complete sovereignty
over direct taxation. The continued application of this doctrine will
thus represent the partial victory of integration over direct tax sove-
reignty, without the benefit of a more integrated approach to fighting
tax avoidance.
IV. TOWARD A CLEARER APPROACH To POLICING TAx
AVOIDANCE
The wholly artificial arrangements doctrine has created an un-
sustainable situation. The EU currently faces an internal vacuum in
which neither Member State sovereignty over taxation nor full inte-
gration is achieved. Member State sovereignty is threatened by a
doctrine that strikes down domestic anti-avoidance rules. Full inte-
gration is threatened by Member State unwillingness to assent to EU-
wide anti-avoidance rules. Within this vacuum are EU taxpayers, left
in a world of greater tax avoidance, lower tax revenues and doctrinal
uncertainty. Ultimately, the EU and its constituents must decide be-
tween retained sovereignty or greater integration in the area of tax
avoidance. Part IV.A discusses the two routes that the EU legal order
can follow: (i) jurisdiction-stripping, which would limit the jurisdic-
tion of the ECJ and favor sovereignty over integration, or (ii) harmo-
nization of anti-avoidance rules, which would favor integration over
sovereignty.
Because of the political impossibility of choosing either of
these paths in the near future, this Article also discusses medium- and
short-term solutions that various EU entities could adopt to ameli-
orate some of the concerns raised in Part III. Part IV.B discusses a
range of medium-term responses, none of which completely ad-
dresses the vacuum created by the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine, but which still could prove more politically palatable than
the long-term solutions discussed in Part IV.A. Finally, Part IV.C
advocates the ECJ's adoption of a more flexible approach to anti-
is to create a seamless 'internal union' where companies are able to invest in any Member
States within the EU without facing discriminatory taxation when they do so. The Member
States, however, often enact policies that protect their national tax bases, sometimes in a
discriminatory fashion. As O'Shea has commented, 'what is "tax avoidance" from one
Member State's perspective is simply an exercise of the freedoms from another state's point
of view.").
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avoidance cases as a short-term solution to the problems raised by the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.
Part IV takes a fairly pessimistic view of the likelihood of the
long-term and medium-term proposals coming to fruition in the near
future because of the institutional constraints inherent in the EC Trea-
ty as it now stands. Since the EC Treaty requires the unanimous con-
sent of all twenty-seven Member States for any measure that affects
direct taxation or strips the ECJ of jurisdiction, most of the solutions
proposed in this Part would require all Member States-regardless of
their very different fiscal policies-to agree to any one course of ac-
tion. The fact that different Member States are currently moving in
different directions-with some supporting integration, 154  others
supporting harmonization,155 and many in between these two ex-
tremes-suggests that reaching unanimity on an issue as contentious
and politically charged as direct taxation is unlikely in the near fu-
ture. Given that the history of the EU is in many ways a history of
the Member States and institutions reaching political decisions de-
spite commentator predictions, 156 however, this Part considers sever-
al solutions that may prove to overcome the institutional hurdles that
seem likely to block almost all efforts to strike a balance between so-
vereignty and integration in the foreseeable future.
A. Long-Term Responses: Sovereignty or Integration?
Ultimately, the EU legal order must move in one direction:
toward greater sovereignty or toward greater integration. This is a
political decision that the EU as a whole needs to make. 157 If this
choice is not made, Member States could build on the core weakness
of the EU legal order and unilaterally nullify ECJ anti-avoidance rul-
154. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
155. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
156. Compare, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Economic
and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6150, 1997) with, e.g., Press Release, European Central Bank,
Tenth Anniversary of the ECB: Publication of a Special Edition of the ECB's Monthly
Bulletin (May 29, 2008).
157. This Article consciously does not decide between these two ultimate goals because
such a decision is a purely political choice to be made by Member State governments.
Although Member States agreed to a certain degree of integration when they joined the EU,
they also attempted to limit this integration by including Article 94 and similar provisions in
the EC Treaty. This Article thus does not assume that integration, rather than sovereignty, is
the logical next step. Cf van Thiel 2008, supra note 7, at 186 (referring to the "agreed and,
therefore, self-imposed, constitutional margins" set out in the EC Treaty).
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ings by refusing both to enforce them domestically and to refer any
future anti-avoidance cases for preliminary rulings. Although do-
mestic courts have shown themselves willing to enforce ECJ rul-
ings, 158 even when these rulings push Member States toward greater
integration at the expense of sovereignty, the effectiveness of EU law
ultimately depends on the willingness of domestic courts to enforce
it.15 9 If one or more Member States determine that the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine and the limits it imposes on Member State
sovereignty are unbearable, those Member States can simply refuse
to enforce relevant ECJ rulings. No matter how many cases are
brought against those Member States, whether by other Member
States or the Commission, enforcement ultimately rests in the hands
of domestic courts.160
Domestic courts are also responsible for determining when
and if to refer questions for preliminary rulings.' 6' Already, the un-
equal number of preliminary rulings from different jurisdictions sug-
gests that certain Member States are less active in turning to the ECJ
158. Alexander Somek, Inexplicable Law: Legality's Adventure in Europe, 15
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 627, 632 (2006) (stating that "national courts have
connived in undermining national sovereignty through 'dis-applying' their own national
laws").
159. See Matthew T. King, Comment, Towards a Practical Convergence: The Dynamic
Uses of Judicial Advice in United States Federal Courts and the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 63 U. PiTT. L. REv. 703, 721 (2002) ("After issuing a Preliminary
Ruling, the ECJ has little to rely on to ensure that the opinion will be enforced as such."); Id.
at 721-22 (referring to J.H.H. Weiler's lack of confidence in Member States' willingness to
enforce ECJ judgments); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked
World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 302 (2004) (pointing out that ECJ does not have
"direct enforcement power" and that it is "up to the national courts, which retained the de
facto sovereign right to implement the ECJ's decisions").
160. See Sara Dillon, The Mirage of EC Environmental Federalism in a Reluctant
Member State Jurisdiction, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 70-71 (1999) (referring to "the
cumbersome process of bringing legal actions against the Member States [under Art. 226],
only to have the Court of Justice make ringing pronouncements of no ultimate utility to
plaintiffs in their national forums"). Note that some Member State courts may be implicitly
following this course of action already. Spain, for example, has not yet referred an anti-
avoidance case to the ECJ, see infra note 203, nor has it reformed its anti-avoidance rules in
accordance with the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, see supra note 141.
161. See id. at 8-9 ("It is not sufficiently appreciated, especially outside Europe, that the
enforcement of Community law depends upon the willingness of the national courts to
accept the role of European courts .... If the level of willingness to refer European law
questions under Article 234 (ex 177) is in fact very uneven across the various Member States
jurisdictions of Europe, this cannot be seen as equitable."); Somek, supra note 158, at 631-
32 (stating that "the success of European integration, from a legal point of view, has
depended vitally on the cooperation between the ECJ and national courts").
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for guidance on direct taxation matters. 162 Member States could re-
spond to the constraints created by the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine by refusing to send any anti-avoidance preliminary refer-
ences to the ECJ. Such a refusal would stop the development of the
doctrine; paired with refusal to enforce any anti-avoidance rulings,
this effective nullification would make the wholly artificial arrange-
ments doctrine entirely toothless. 163
The clear downside to this unilateral nullification is that it
would ultimately undermine the entire legal order of the EU. The EU
relies on enforcement of EU law by all Member State courts. Were
certain courts to refuse to enforce ECJ rulings in certain areas, the va-
lidity and enforceability of all EU law would be put in question and
opened to domestic public pressure. Member State nullification is
thus a worst-case scenario,164 but it is instructive to include it here to
emphasize that, if Member States and EU institutions do not other-
wise respond to the ECJ's development of the wholly artificial ar-
rangements doctrine, nullification could be the ultimate outcome as
Member States strive to save their sovereignty over direct taxation
from the encroachment of the ECJ. To avoid this worst-case scena-
rio, the choice of outcome is essentially a choice between two long-
term goals: (i) jurisdiction-stripping or (ii) harmonization of anti-
avoidance rules.
These two long-term goals essentially take two different paths
to achieve the same goal, which is the elimination of the asymmetry
that currently exists between judicial and legislative authority over
direct taxation in the EU. In the area of direct taxation, this asymme-
try exists because the legislative bodies lack authority to regulate
without the unanimous consent of Member States, but the judiciary,
in the form of the ECJ, has jurisdiction over direct tax cases that raise
freedom of movement questions. In contrast, other areas of EU law,
as well as taxation in other countries, do not exhibit such asymmetry.
In the EU, for example, many subject areas require unanimous con-
sent, but these areas either are not as closely tied to sovereignty, thus
making it easier for Member States to vote in favor of legislative
measures, 165 or do not fall under the ECJ's jurisdiction. 166 In the
162. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
163. Although the Commission could continue to bring cases before the ECJ, complete
Member State refusal to enforce anti-avoidance rulings would undermine the effectiveness
of such an approach.
164. Although another potential response could be withdrawal from the EU, this Article
sees such a response as unlikely. For more on the right of Member States to withdraw
unilaterally, see Conte, supra note 9, at 384-85.
165. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 9.
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United States, subnational tax measures meant to curb tax avoidance
may be struck down by the United States Supreme Court, but the
asymmetry exhibited here is not as pressing an issue because the
United States Congress has the authority to pass harmonizing meas-
ures. 167 The judicial activism of the European Court of Justice in the
direct tax arena 168 is thus different from other comparable exercises
of judicial power because the legislature has no ability to respond
without the consent of all Member States. 169 Any ultimate solution
must thus resolve this asymmetry, either by limiting the ECJ's juris-
diction to match the authority of other EU institutions or by expand-
ing the authority of other EU institutions to match the jurisdiction of
the ECJ.
1. Restriction of Jurisdiction
The one response that would address the fundamental issue of
the ECJ's encroachment on Member State sovereignty over direct
taxation would be to restrict the Court's jurisdiction by preventing it
from considering anti-avoidance cases-or direct tax cases entirely.
Although drastic, this solution was considered during negotiations
over the proposed Reform Treaty.170 With limited jurisdiction, the
ECJ would not have the opportunity to develop or apply the wholly
artificial arrangements doctrine, and Member States would be free to
retain anti-avoidance rules that violated freedom of movement.
In exchange for retained sovereignty over direct taxation,
however, the Member States would create a roadblock to greater in-
167. See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA"), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1381, 1387 (2007)
(stating, in the context of a case limiting states' abilities to prevent avoidance of sales tax
due to Dormant Commerce Clause concerns, that "[t]he [Supreme] Court's interpretation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, can be superseded by Congress").
168. This reference to "judicial activism" is not meant to be politically charged. While
some commentators have criticized the ECJ's foray into direct tax cases, others have seen
the Court's exercise of jurisdiction as proper. Compare Peter J. Wattel, Judicial Restraint
and Three Trends in the ECJ's Direct Tax Case Law, 62 TAx L. REv. 205, 207 (2008)
(stating that "the court was overplaying its hand (its competence and its possibilities) in its
activist years") with van Thiel 2008, supra note 7, at 183 ("The criticism in academic and
political discussions that the ECJ would go beyond its constitutional role, is without
substance. It often refers to 'judicial activism' in a negative way.").
169. Cf Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (stating that "Congress
is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate
mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes").
170. Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test,
49 B.C. L. REv. 1277, 1280 (2008).
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tegration and a gaping inconsistency in EU law. The ECJ currently
has jurisdiction over any question regarding the interpretation of EU
law,' 7 ' and it is this jurisdiction that has allowed the ECJ to push
forward integration by invalidating Member State measures that limit
the freedom of movement. One of the fundamental principles of EU
law is the principle of supremacy, pursuant to which EU law is
granted primacy over any contradictory domestic law. 172 Were the
ECJ no longer permitted to rule on questions regarding the interpreta-
tion of EU law that involved direct taxation, integration would stall
and the principle of supremacy, now so fundamental to EU law,
would not apply in all cases. Furthermore, carving direct taxation
cases out of the Court's jurisdiction creates a clear incentive for
Member States and EU institutions to claim that challenged measures
that would otherwise fall under the court's jurisdiction in fact relate
to direct taxation.
Logistically, restricting the court's jurisdiction would require
amendment of the Treaty and would again require the unanimous
support of the Member States. 173 Although such support may be
more likely for a measure meant to curtail ECJ action, the unanimity
requirement still means that such a drastic change is unlikely to be
made in the short term, particularly since proposals for just such a re-
striction did not make it into the Reform Treaty. Moreover, since re-
stricting ECJ jurisdiction would have far-reaching consequences for
EU law as a whole, as well as the future of integration, this solution
would only be feasible if all Member States decide to prioritize sove-
reignty in the area of direct taxation over integration.
2. Harmonization of Anti-Avoidance Rules
The one response that would allow for full integration of anti-
avoidance rules would be complete harmonization of these rules.
Such harmonization would leave the regulation of tax avoidance to
171. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 234.
172. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the
Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 278-79 (2001)
(outlining the history of the Court's development of the principle of supremacy, which was
not initially protected in the Treaty); Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585;
Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C R.
629
173. This would likely also require consultation with the Court itself, since amendment
to the Statute of the Court of Justice requires unanimous consent and consultation with the
ECJ. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 245.
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the institutions of the EU other than the ECJ and the Member States,
and the entire EU would share a uniform approach to policing tax
avoidance. 174 In effect, Member States would cede all anti-avoidance
authority to the EU, and EU institutions would set the level of per-
missible tax avoidance within the borders of the EU.
The idea of direct tax harmonization is not unprecedented. As
early as 1962, the Neumark Committee proposed harmonizing the
corporate tax systems of Member States, 175 and proposals for harmo-
nizing reforms have continued since then. 176 In 2001, such proposals
resulted in the European Commission launching its effort to reform
corporate taxes by creating a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB). 177 The CCCTB would consolidate the tax bases of
certain multinational corporations within the territorial borders of the
EU and then determine apportionment among the Member States ac-
cording to a multi-factor formula. 178 To succeed at filling the legisla-
tive vacuum created by the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine,
however, harmonization of direct taxation would have to apply to the
tax systems of all twenty-seven Member States and all taxpayers
within those twenty-seven Member States. As currently envisioned,
neither CCCTB nor other proposals are likely to have such reach, and
the difficulties that the CCCTB faces illustrate the difficulties any di-
rect tax harmonization effort is likely to confront.
First, it is unclear when the Commission will be ready to in-
troduce the CCCTB plan. Although the Commission planned to
make such an introduction by the end of 2008, the EU Tax Commis-
sioner Ldzl6 Kovdcs announced that this planned schedule would not
be met, stating that, although he "remain[ed] fully committed to this
project, [he] would rather present a perfectly elaborated and well jus-
tified product at the appropriate time than present an incomplete one
174. The ECJ and Member States could continue to play a role by bringing or
considering cases challenging the harmonizing measures as violations of the EC Treaty, but
this would be very different from the current situation, where the ECJ and Member States
are effectively the only institutions policing tax avoidance.
175. Jack Mintz & Joann M. Weiner, Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union, 62 TAx L. REv. 81, 88-
89 (2008).
176. Id. at 89.
177. Id.at8l.
178. For more on the specifics of CCCTB, see, for example, id.; Reuven Avi-Yonah &
Kimberly Clausing, More Open Issues Regarding the Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in
the European Union, 62 TAx L. REv. 119 (2008); Matthias Mors, What Does "Game
Theory" Tell Finance Ministers About Whether They Should Support a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the EU?, 62 TAx L. REv. 125 (2008); Stephen Utz, The
European CCCTB as the Outcome of a Virtual Game, 62 TAx L. REv. 135 (2008).
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just to meet an artificial deadline."'1 79 Second, the likelihood of
CCCTB being accepted by all twenty-seven Member States in the
near future is debatable. Although Professors Mintz and Weiner ar-
gue that "it is possible for the EU to reach a negotiated agreement
that is satisfactory to all players" in the context of the CCCTB, 80
other commentators disagree. 18' If the unanimous agreement of all
twenty-seven Member States is not possible, certain Member States
could use enhanced cooperation, pursuant to which a limited group of
Member States would unanimously agree to CCCTB. 82 Although
such a development is possible, it would not provide a full solution to
the problems created and highlighted by the wholly artificial ar-
rangements doctrine. If only certain Member States have a harmo-
nized tax base, while others maintain their individual tax systems, the
potential for tax avoidance by way of deferral and allocation remains
and the need for a harmonized approach to anti-avoidance rules
would still exist, particularly if the Member States that refuse to
adopt the CCCTB are the very ones whose tax systems are most fa-
vorable to avoidance transactions.
Moreover, even if all twenty-seven Member States agree to
the CCCTB, the proposal as it is currently envisioned makes CCCTB
optional. 183 Under this proposal, multinational corporations would
opt in to using the consolidated tax base, meaning that corporations
for which the use of this base would be disadvantageous, perhaps due
to the limits it could place on beneficial avoidance transactions, could
choose not to take part. 184 As currently envisioned, CCCTB thus
does not reach the level of harmonization necessary to harmonize an-
ti-avoidance rules across the EU and thus fill the legislative vacuum
created by the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. 185 Further-
179. Mintz & Weiner, supra note 175, at 82.
180. Id. at 114.
181. See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 178; Mors, supra note 178; Utz, supra note
178.
182. See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 178, at 120 (stating that "[t]he change may
occur nonetheless, particularly if the decision is taken through the enhanced cooperation
procedure that would allow action to proceed without the unanimous support of member
country governments").
183. See id. at 122.
184. See id. Note that many Member States have advocated a compulsory system for
this very reason. See Mors, supra note 178, at 129 (stating that "[o]ne would a priori assume
that the revenue effects of a compulsory system would be 'more positive' as multinational
groups would not have the possibility to choose one of two tax systems, which results in a
lower tax burden").
185. Note that references to the "relatively innovative anti-avoidance measure" of the
CCCTB do not change this argument. Mintz & Weiner, supra note 174, at 93-94. This
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more, even if the proposal introduced by the Commission were com-
pulsory and accepted unanimously by all Member States, it would
apply only to corporations, so cases such as Lasteyrie would still fall
under the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. Any attempt at
harmonizing tax rates also seems unlikely at this juncture, 86 so nei-
ther complete base nor rate harmonization to the extent necessary to
underlie a harmonized approach to policing tax avoidance is on the
horizon. Finally, even base or rate harmonization would not be suffi-
cient to combat all tax avoidance. Jurisdictions worldwide do not po-
lice only international tax avoidance; domestic tax avoidance is itself
a challenge to raising revenue and shaping fiscal policy, and the insti-
tutions and Member States of the EU would need a harmonized ap-
proach to domestic tax avoidance even in the face of a harmonized
base and rates.
Harmonization could also occur in the form of de facto har-
monization, pursuant to which Member States would pressure other
Member States to change their approach to tax avoidance. One mod-
el for bottom-up de facto harmonization in the area of taxation is the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) created by sub-
national states in the United States.1 87 Although this applies to indi-
rect taxation and the constitutional limits imposed on taxation in the
United States are unquestionably different from the freedom of
movement limits imposed on taxation in the EU, the SSUTA still
provides a useful de facto harmonization model for comparison be-
cause it represents the possibility of partial tax agreement at the
Member State level in the absence of complete legislated harmoniza-
tion. After attempts by these subnational states to prevent buyers
from avoiding sales tax were struck down by the United States Su-
preme Court as a violation of the Commerce Clause, 88 several states
created a multilateral agreement to harmonize their sales tax sys-
tems.1 89 Although the ability of Congress to legislate in this area
highlights the lack of asymmetry between legislative and judicial bo-
dies in the United States case, the multilateral agreement suggests
measure, known as the "switch-over clause," is meant to prevent avoidance transactions
between the EU and third countries, and thus applies "to certain income earned outside the
CCCTB's territorial scope." Id. This measure does not apply to corporations that choose
not to opt in to the CCCTB, nor is it clear whether it applies to countries within the EU that
do not take part in enhanced cooperation.
186. See Graetz & Warren, supra note 4, at 1189 n. 127 (stating that the Commission has
opposed moving toward rate harmonization).
187. See STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAx AGREEMENT, available at http://
streamlinedsalestax.org/agreement/htm (hereinafter SSUTA).
188. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
189. Galle, supra note 163, at 1387.
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one method for de facto harmonization. A further benefit of follow-
ing this model is that Member State multilateral action in the area of
anti-avoidance would respond to concerns about the principle of sub-
sidiarity. 190 The SSUTA also provides a warning of the dangers of
partial de facto harmonization, however, in that some major retail
states have refused to sign on to the agreement, thereby halting com-
plete harmonization of state taxation. 191
In the absence of harmonization initiated by the states, de fac-
to harmonization could also take the form of higher-tax jurisdictions
coercing lower-tax jurisdictions into raising their rates or disallowing
avoidance transactions within their borders, or it could take the form
of a race to the bottom, with lower-tax jurisdictions pulling other
Member State rates down in an effort to compete. Regardless of
which form it takes, however, de facto harmonization is no more
likely than harmonization at the EU level in the foreseeable future,
since both require the unanimous agreement, whether implicit or ex-
plicit, of all Member States to result in effective harmonization of an-
ti-avoidance rules. If Member States choose to prioritize integration
over sovereignty, however, harmonization will be the ultimate solu-
tion.
B. Middle-Term Responses
Given the difficulties inherent in any long-term solution that
requires the unanimous consent of twenty-seven Member States with
very different views of fiscal policy, the institutional constraints of
the EU make either long-term response unlikely in the near future.
Since the Member States and institutions of the EU are unlikely to
reach the political consensus necessary to achieve either of the above
results, this Part considers three other approaches that the EU could
take: (i) creation of an anti-avoidance agency, (ii) codification of the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, and (iii) an increase in anti-
avoidance test cases. While none of these approaches will avoid the
ultimate decision between sovereignty and integration, they may be
more politically palatable in the shorter term, although they are likely
to face considerable opposition in the immediate future. That said,
this Article considers all of them to be second-best solutions that are
not as effective as the long-term solutions discussed in Part IV.A.
190. See supra note 33.
191. See generally Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Bd., State Info,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last visited Fed 8, 2010) (not
including California or New York on the list of participating states).
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1. Creation of an Anti-Avoidance Agency
In a 2001 White Paper on European governance, the Commis-
sion proposed greater reliance on autonomous agencies. 92 In the
words of the Commission, the benefits of such agencies include
"their ability to draw on highly technical, sectoral know-how, the in-
creased visibility they give for the sectors concerned (and sometimes
the public) and the cost-savings that they offer to business."' 193 One
response to the creation of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine
could thus be the establishment of an anti-avoidance agency designed
to review Member State anti-avoidance rules and clarify the scope of
the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine in light of Member State
goals. Such an agency would reduce the inconsistency of the ECJ's
application of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine while still
allowing for flexibility in determining which anti-avoidance rules are
permitted under the doctrine. This solution would address the con-
cerns with inconsistency and legitimacy addressed in Part III, while
taking the decision as to the validity of an anti-avoidance rule out of
the hands of the Court.
Such an agency would, however, require unanimous support
and would be extremely unlikely to gain the support of Member
States because it would continue to undermine Member State sove-
reignty over direct taxation and it could appear to be a first step in the
direction of complete tax harmonization. Furthermore, in order to be
effective, the agency would likely need greater competency than that
envisioned by the Commission. In the White Paper, the Commission
stated that autonomous agencies would not be appropriate if they
were granted "decision-making power in areas in which they would
have to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, exercise politi-
cal discretion, or carry out complex economic assessments," all of
which apply to a determination of the validity of an anti-avoidance
rule under the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine. 194 Finally, the
ECJ would still retain ultimate authority in interpreting the wholly ar-
tificial arrangements doctrine, and would thus be able to strike down
improper rulings by such an agency. 95
192. Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 482 final (July
25, 2001).
193. Id. at 24.
194. Id.
195. It is not clear how much deference, if any, the ECJ would be required to give to an
agency decision. Article 230 authorizes the ECJ to review actions by various EU institutions
"on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement,
infringement of [the EC] Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of
powers." EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 230. The Court appears to exercise review agency
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2. Codification of the Wholly Artificial Arrangements Doctrine
Another potential remedy that could reduce the federalism
concerns inherent in a remedy that depends entirely on the ECJ
would be the codification of the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine by the Council of the EU. Codification-or at least discussions
of codification-of anti-avoidance rules and doctrines has become
fairly common in jurisdictions beyond the EU. In the United States,
codification of the economic substance doctrine has been proposed
numerous times over the past decade, with supporters lauding the
greater certainty and democratic legitimacy that would accompany
codification and opponents citing the lack of flexibility and difficulty
of administrability associated with codification. 196 Outside of the
United States, many countries have codified general anti-avoidance
actions differently in different contexts. Compare Philip A. Akakwam, The Standard of
Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code: Circumscribing the Role of GATT Panels in
Reviewing National Antidumping Determinations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 277, 288-89
(1996) ("The EU system vests administrative agencies with wide discretion, the exercise of
which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often reluctant to scrutinize.") with Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for Decisions by Political Trustees, 15 DUKE J. CoMP.
& INT'L L. 1, 42 (2004) ("Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is a
fundamental precept of European Law.").
196. In the United States, opponents of codification of the economic substance doctrine
have pointed to two major problems with such an approach: (i) codification proposals
appear to create a higher standard than does the current judge-made economic substance
doctrine, and (ii) codification, even were it to incorporate the exact standard used by courts,
is not necessarily appropriate for a standard such as the economic substance doctrine. See
Keinan, supra note 88, at 448 (discouraging codification because "it is questionable whether
codification of common law doctrines is the right answer [and] because the current proposal
is inconsistent with the majority of court decisions on economic substance"). In regards to
the first criticism, commentators, including the Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association (NYSBA Tax Section), have pointed out that recent proposals have set out a far
more stringent standard that would likely prohibit many more transactions than are currently
disallowed under the economic substance doctrine. See NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, NYSB TAX SECTION COMMENTS ON TREASURY'S PROPOSAL To CODIFY THE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 19 (July 25, 2000) (stating that the proposal, unlike the
economic substance doctrine applied in practice, "denies tax benefits arising from a
transaction merely because the taxpayer does not anticipate a pre-tax profit"); Bankman,
supra note 82, at 26 (stating that "basing a test primarily on the relationship between [tax
benefits and nontax] benefits raises problems of its own"); Keinan, supra note 88, at 443
(criticizing codification proposals for creating a higher standard than that used by a majority
of courts). In regards to the second criticism, one of the major benefits of a judicially
created doctrine such as economic substance is its flexibility, and this benefit would be lost
were the doctrine codified. When testifying before Congress about the 2004 codification
proposal, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Treasury stated that "the doctrine right now is a
very flexible doctrine that is applied by the courts as needed." Id. at 451.
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rules (GAARs). Both Australia and Canada, for example, have
GAARs, which have met with both qualified success and significant
criticism. 197
As with the creation of an anti-avoidance agency, codification
would reduce the uncertainty currently surrounding the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine. Unlike an agency, however, codification
would remove the flexibility inherent in an anti-avoidance doc-
trine. 198 Codification of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine
would effectively create a bright-line rule as to exactly what level of
anti-avoidance rule was permitted in the EU. This switch from an ex
post standard to an ex ante rule could have the unintended effect of
increased tax planning and perhaps even more aggressive avoidance
as taxpayers and their advisors pushed tax avoidance to the limit of
the codified doctrine. 199
Furthermore, the EU's federal structure and Member States'
concerns over sovereignty mean that codification is extremely unlike-
ly at this juncture. Codification would require the unanimous con-
sent of all twenty-seven Member States and, although such consent
would grant legitimacy to the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine,
concerns over the sovereignty inherent in direct taxation make such
unanimous consent unlikely if not impossible.
3. Anti-Avoidance Test Cases
A third possible approach lies in the hands of Member States.
As shown by the cases discussed in Part II, the wholly artificial ar-
rangements doctrine develops as the Court considers direct taxation
free movement cases. While many of these cases arrived at the ECJ
by way of individual taxpayers challenging Member State measures
before their domestic courts, others, such as Thin Cap GLO and CFC
Test Claimants,200 arrived at the Court as test cases referred by do-
mestic courts to gauge the ECJ's approach to anti-avoidance meas-
ures. Member State courts could thus make a concerted effort to
send an increasing number of anti-avoidance test cases to the Court
to clarify the outlines of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.
197. See generally Julie Cassidy, "To GAAR or Not to GAAR - That is the Question:"
Canadian and Australian Attempts to Combat Tax Avoidance, 36 OTTAWA L. REv. 259
(2004).
198. See, e.g., Dennis Ventry, Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress,
118 TAx NOTES 1405 (Mar. 31, 2008).
199. For more on this concern in the context of the economic substance doctrine, see
generally id.
200. C-524/04,2007 E.C.R. 1-2107.
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Test cases before the ECJ have led to developments in areas
from equality for same-sex partners to protection of copyright to pay
discrimination. 201 Test cases in other areas have come either directly
from governments or government agencies, or have involved gov-
ernment agencies educating or assisting individual litigants in order
to clarify the outlines of the law or push forward a legal question. 20 2
In the field of direct taxation, certain Member States, such as Germa-
ny, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are currently much
more willing than others, such as Ireland, Italy and Spain to send pre-
liminary references to the ECJ.20 3 Although this distinction could ar-
guably be based on the former Member States having more proble-
matic direct tax measures than the latter Member States, the disparity
is likely due at least as much to willingness on the part of some
Member States to make such referrals. Were Member States to over-
come their hostility to preliminary references and increase the num-
ber and variety of anti-avoidance cases before the European Court of
Justice, they would likely force the Court to clarify the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine. Even were some Member State courts
unwilling to refer preliminary rulings to the ECJ under Article 234,
other Member States could potentially bring a case to the Commis-
sion under Article 227. Alternatively, the Commission could exer-
cise its right to bring an enforcement action against a Member State
under Article 226.204
201. See Paul L. Spackman, Note and Comment, Grant v. South-West Trains: Equality
for Same-Sex Partners in the European Community, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063,
1066 n.11 (1997) (referring to test cases in fight for equality); Karl Ruping, Copyright and
an Integrated European Market: Conflicts with Free Movement of Goods, Competition Law,
and National Discrimination, 11 TEMP. INT'L & CoM. L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (referring to test
case in fighting bootlegs); Erika Szyszczak, Antidiscrimination Law in the European
Community, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 624, 637-38 (2009) (charting the development of the
"equal pay for equal work" principle in the EU, which "was developed by the Court in a
series of test cases .... ).
202. See, e.g., Eva In~s Obergfell, On Division of Competence in the EU- The Tobacco
Advertising Prohibition Directive Test Case, 1 THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FORUM 153 (2001)
(discussing generally the successful test case that Germany brought against the European
Parliament and the Council to challenge the Tobacco Advertising Ban Directive); Bob A.
Hepple, Social Rights in the European Economic Community: A British Perspective, 11
COMP. LAB. L.J. 425, 431 (1990) ("The British and Northern Irish Equal Opportunities
Commissions adopted test case strategies, assisting individual complainants in a number of
key cases, sometimes in collaboration with trade unions, before the domestic courts and
tribunals and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There has been a dynamic interaction
between rulings of the ECJ... and decisions of United Kingdom courts, which in turn have
been used in the development of EEC equality law.").
203. Pistone, supra note 35, at 534.
204. Despite these many remedial avenues, the EC Treaty does not provide a means for
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Regardless of what institution brings or refers a test case,
however, relying solely on test cases is unlikely to respond adequate-
ly to the concerns raised by the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine. First, although Article 234 requires courts of last instance to
refer to the ECJ questions of EU law that are necessary to their
judgment, critics have pointed out that the lack of a system of appeal
for these very courts means that "one could conclude that there is no
real obligation to refer. '205 Relying on test cases would also merely
mean that the development of the doctrine described in Part II would
be accelerated, not that the shape of the doctrine or the way in which
it would be applied would necessarily change. The ECJ would still
be responsible for interpreting and applying the doctrine, and the
Court could continue on its path of vague definitions and unpredicta-
ble outcomes. Moreover, test cases would not reduce sovereignty
concerns, since the ECJ would remain the ultimate arbiter of anti-
avoidance cases, and the Member States would still be ceding their
authority over direct taxation to the court. There is also no guarantee
that the ECJ would consider all of the test cases. Some commenta-
tors argue that the ECJ has effectively developed a justiciability doc-
trine similar to the U.S. requirement of a legitimate case or contro-
versy, so Member State courts would have to wait for actual cases or
controversies to bring test cases.20 6 Furthermore, as discussed above,
Member State courts could ultimately choose not to follow the ECJ's
holdings in test cases, thereby not changing the dynamic currently at
work between the ECJ and the Member States over the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine.207
Although this approach would give Member States more con-
trol in terms of the initial referral to the Court, it would still raise fe-
deralism concerns since the ECJ would retain its current role as final
arbiter of the legitimacy of Member State anti-avoidance measures.
This approach would also put more Member State measures at risk of
private litigants to bring test cases. They must instead take the indirect route of bringing a
case before a Member State court, which can then refer the EU law question(s) to the ECJ
under Article 234. See Xavier Lewis, Standing of Private Plaintiffs to Annul Generally
Applicable European Community Measures: If the System is Broken, Where Should It Be
Fixed?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1496 (2007) (discussing the limits on the only private right
of action, an action for annulment, which is authorized by Article 230).
205. Somek, supra note 158, at 633.
206. See King, supra note 159, at 731.
207. See Somek, supra note 158, at 641 ("The largest problem lies in the fact that
national courts still have some ability to disregard rulings of the ECJ."); see also Hepple,
supra note 202, at 431 (referring to the "dynamic interaction" between ECJ cases and UK
courts in developing "equality law").
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being struck down than would an approach of merely waiting for
such measures to be brought before the Court by taxpayer challenges.
C. Short-Term Response: Adopting a More Flexible Standard
Until the Member States and institutions of the EU are willing
to address the challenges posed by tax avoidance in the EU, both the
long-term solutions discussed in Part IV.A and the more moderate
approaches discussed in Part IV.B are unlikely to gain much traction.
This Article argues, however, that the concerns raised in Part III-for
taxpayers, Member States and the EU as a whole-must be ad-
dressed. This Part IV.C thus suggests a much more short-term ap-
proach to modifying the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.
While this approach will admittedly not solve the ultimate problem of
the legislative vacuum created by the doctrine, nor will it assist the
constituents of the EU in choosing sovereignty or integration, it will
solve some of the concerns with the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine and does not require unanimous consent. Furthermore, since
the ECJ is the institution that has created the wholly artificial ar-
rangements doctrine, this approach is fitting since it only requires the
involvement of the court. Under this short-term approach, the court
would adopt a more flexible approach to anti-avoidance cases that
would allow the court to consider the purpose behind the wholly ar-
tificial arrangements doctrine, the challenged Member State anti-
avoidance rule and the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty.
Although some commentators believe that the ECJ's tax juri-
sprudence is cyclical and that the court has already pulled back from
its most activist stance and begun to approach direct tax cases with
more flexibility,208 these analyses of the Court's anti-avoidance cases
appear to end with Oy AA. As discussed in Part II and Part III, Oy
AA was unique in that it was the only anti-avoidance case in which
the ECJ used the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine to uphold
the measure in question.209 Furthermore, cases following Qy AA re-
turned the court to its more stringent approach, and the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine was again used to strike down Member
State measures. 210  Without any evidence that the Court's anti-
208. See van Thiel 2008, supra note 7, at 181; see also Wattel, supra note 168, at 205.
209. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
210. Case C-201/05, The Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation v.
Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2008 E.C.R. 1-02875; Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeff
NV v. Belgische Staat, 2008 E.C.R. 1-00173; Case C-451/05, Europ~enne et
Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v. Directeur g6n~ral des imp6ts, Ministre
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avoidance pendulum has already swung toward greater restraint,
therefore, it seems likely that the court will continue to apply the doc-
trine as it has in every case other than Oy AA unless and until it
adopts the more flexible standard advocated in this Part IV.C.
The first step that the ECJ could take to remedy some of the
problems associated with the doctrine would be to apply the doctrine
more consciously and explicitly. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has never referred to the "economic substance doctrine," it has made
clear that it considers the economic substance of a transaction, 21' and
lower federal courts have referred to the doctrine itself.212 While this
has evidently not removed the uncertainty over the outlines of the
doctrine or its application, it does at least mean that taxpayers in the
United States have more guidance than do taxpayers or Member
States in the EU. Following on this more explicit application, the
ECJ could, in applying the doctrine, more explicitly define its out-
lines. The court could state outright whether there is a distinction be-
tween impermissible tax avoidance and tax evasion, whether the
court and domestic courts should apply a subjective prong alongside
the objective prong, what explicitly would qualify as a wholly artifi-
cial arrangement, and how the court decides whether to act unilateral-
ly or leave the ultimate decision of a measure's legitimacy to a do-
mestic court. This approach may not solve the federalism problems
inherent in the court's development of a doctrine used to challenge
Member State anti-avoidance measures, since the court itself is still
the actor challenging these measures. This approach would, howev-
er, reduce the internal inconsistencies and uncertainties currently
present in the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine.
The court could also go one step further and adopt a more
flexible approach to anti-avoidance cases. This would build on one
of the inherent benefits of a judicial doctrine applied ex ante. In Oy
AA, the Court toyed with allowing anti-avoidance rules that applied
more broadly than wholly artificial arrangements. For the first time
in its application of the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, the
Court suggested that a measure could be proportionate to the justifi-
cation of preventing tax avoidance even if it was not only meant to
target wholly artificial arrangements:
public, 2007 E.C.R. 1-08251
211. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
212. See, e.g., Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44, 54 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "[tihe
economic substance doctrine has been consistently applied by the courts for many years in a
variety of tax situations").
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Even if the legislation at issue in the main proceedings
is not specifically designed to exclude from the tax
advantage it confers purely artificial arrangements,
devoid of economic reality, created with the aim of
escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated
by activities carried out on national territory, such leg-
islation may nevertheless be regarded as proportionate
to the objectives pursued, taken as a whole. 213
Although the court appears to have backed away from this
approach, looking more broadly to the purpose of the wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine could prove more favorable in terms of
both internal inconsistency and Member State sovereignty. As de-
tailed in Part III, the doctrine emerged out of the court's concern that
anti-avoidance rules were infringing on free movement between
Member States to a greater degree than was necessary to ensure pre-
vention of tax avoidance. The court moved, however, from the prin-
ciple of proportionality to a more stringent requirement that anti-
avoidance rules be not just proportional to the goal of preventing tax
avoidance but that they apply only to wholly artificial arrangements.
Following the lead of commentators who have suggested that anti-
avoidance doctrines in other jurisdictions focus more on legislative
purpose, 214 the ECJ could consider legislative purpose as part of an
overall more flexible approach to anti-avoidance cases.
Considering purpose, intent, motive, and similar factors is of
course quite controversial in the world of statutory interpretation. 215
As will be detailed below, however, this Article proposes not the
consideration of one specific purpose, but rather a multi-factor flexi-
ble approach that takes into account the purposes underlying the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, the Member State measure,
and freedom of movement jurisdiction as a whole. In other words,
this Article advocates that, in the short term, the court adopt a flexi-
ble standard pursuant to which the inconsistent goals of sovereignty
on the one hand and integration on the other be considered in light of
the specific Member State anti-avoidance measure in question. Giv-
en the impossibility of satisfying all of these interests in any one
case, no matter how strict a construction the court adopts, this Article
argues that such a flexible standard is the best short-term approach to
213. Case C-231/05, Oy AA, 2007 E.C.R 1-06373, 63.
214. See McCormack, supra note 13.
215. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990).
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a problem that ultimately requires a much larger solution, as dis-
cussed in Part IV.A. Furthermore, given that even those who advo-
cate strict construction generally agree that more flexible interpretive
approaches are appropriate when considering constitutional provi-
sions,216 as well as in the context of taxation,217 this Article contends
that anti-avoidance cases, which pit the broad free movement provi-
sions of the EC Treaty against the complicated anti-avoidance meas-
ures in Member State tax codes, are particularly suited to such an ap-
proach.218
Rather than focusing on whether the Member State measure
applies only to wholly artificial arrangements, the Court should take
a broader view and consider: (i) the purposes behind the wholly ar-
tificial arrangements doctrine; (ii) the purposes behind the measure in
question, and (iii) the purposes behind the Treaty provisions that the
ECJ interpreted when it created the doctrine. Since the ECJ itself
created the wholly artificial arrangements doctrine, the first consider-
ation would not be a stretch for the Court. Instead, this would merely
require a return to applying the principle of proportionality, thereby
perhaps allowing more Member State rules to stand if their effect on
freedom of movement is not disproportionate to the goal of prevent-
ing tax avoidance. Such an approach would likely allow less discri-
minatory or restrictive measures to remain, even if they extended
beyond wholly artificial arrangements. Anti-avoidance rules would
thus exist on a spectrum: those that posed significant restrictions on
freedom of movement would have to be more narrowly targeted,
216. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 282 (1982) (stating that "virtually everyone who writes
on the question thinks that constitutional provisions should not be construed as strictly as
statutory provisions").
217. See McCormack, supra note 13, at 724-25 (stating that reference to overarching
principles to determine the purpose of a provision is more appropriate in "the particularized
context of tax law").
218. While some of the reasons for considering purpose in the context of the Internal
Revenue Code do not apply here, cf Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The
Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 492, 497 (1995) (referring to the "theoretical construct
that overarches the sum total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be
captured by it"), purpose seems particularly appropriate to anti-avoidance measures being
challenged as freedom of movement violations both because of their complexity, see
Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code,
64 N.C. L. REv. 623, 664 (1986) (referring to the importance of considering complexity
when interpreting a statute), and because of the goals of the common market. In other
words, an anti-avoidance measure that was explicitly crafted to discriminate against
residents of other Member States could be considered more anathema to the freedom of
movement than an anti-avoidance measure used by jurisdictions around the world that
happens to implicate freedom of movement.
[48:177
TAXA VOIDANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
while those that had less of an effect on integration could prevent
more transactions. By allowing some more anti-avoidance rules to
remain, this would slightly ameliorate the sovereignty concerns of
Member States.
The second and third considerations in this more flexible
standard, however, could respond more directly to Member State
concerns. Under the second step, the Court would consider whether
the Member State measure was actually intended to prevent tax
avoidance that was undermining the Member State's ability to raise
revenue or otherwise protect its tax base. Although the Member
State's intention need not be controlling, consideration of the reasons
for the measure would again be likely to lead the Court to uphold
more anti-avoidance measures with the actual purpose of preventing
tax avoidance, rather than treating all anti-avoidance measures as at-
tempts by Member States to block integration. This inquiry could al-
so consider whether the measure in question was of a type recom-
mended by the OECD or similar to measures in other jurisdictions.
Finally, under the third step, the ECJ would consider the purpose un-
derlying the Treaty provisions at issue in anti-avoidance cases, in-
cluding Article 94 (reserving Member State sovereignty) and Article
234 (granting the ECJ jurisdiction). The Court would consider
whether, in reserving autonomy over direct taxation, Article 94 was
intended to allow any and all anti-avoidance rules that encroach on
free movement or, whether, in granting the ECJ jurisdiction to hear
all preliminary rulings involving Treaty interpretation, regardless of
the areas of law that they raise, Article 234 was intended to remove
restrictions to free movement even in areas covered by Article 94.
This approach would raise numerous questions, many of which are
currently being debated in the literature on direct taxation in the
EU.219 Whose intent should the Court consider-the original parties
to the Treaty, or the parties that renewed the relevant Articles in sub-
sequent treaties? Could the original drafters have foreseen the push
toward integration that resulted from the Court's jurisdiction? Can
the Court, itself the engine of integration in many areas of the law,
objectively judge the purposes behind the relevant Treaty provisions?
Regardless of these questions, however, considering the overall pur-
pose of the Treaty when applying the wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine would more directly respond to concerns that the Court is
impermissibly expanding into the area of direct taxation in violation
of Member States' expectations. This inquiry could also welcome
219. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 33; van Thiel 2008, supra note 7; Wattel, supra note
168.
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the input of other Member States and EU institutions regarding their
own interpretations of the purposes of the relevant Treaty provisions.
Such a response may still not be sufficient for sovereignty-conscious
Member States, however, if the Court's involvement in direct taxa-
tion, even when applying a purposive approach, is itself seen as a
threat to sovereignty.
This flexible approach does raise its own concerns and is thus
only a short-term response while the Member States and institutions
of the EU gather the support for other longer-term responses. First, it
is unclear whether the ECJ would adopt a more flexible approach.
The proposed jurisdiction-stripping and threat of Member State nulli-
fication may be sufficient to encourage the Court to move toward this
approach, however, particularly when combined with the Court's
general trend of moving back toward flexibility and deference to
Member States after strongly pro-integration decisions. 220 Second,
the threat of the legislative vacuum created by the doctrine may be
necessary for any long-term agreement. Were this flexible approach
to replace the doctrine, it is possible that Member States and institu-
tions could lose the incentive to strike a balance between sovereignty
and integration. While this is possible, however, the flexible ap-
proach is likely to maintain uncertainty and unlikely to allow all anti-
avoidance rules to stand. As such, Member States and institutions
are still likely to push toward a more definite long-term solution even
in the context of this more purposive approach.
As a first step toward addressing the concerns raised by the
wholly artificial arrangements doctrine and slowing the need for ul-
timate agreement over sovereignty or integration in the area of direct
taxation, applying a more flexible standard that considers proportio-
nality, Member State intent, and the purpose of the relevant Treaty
provisions would allow the ECJ to retain its general jurisdiction
while still allowing Member States the ability to police tax avoid-
ance. Note that, in proposing this more flexible approach, this Ar-
ticle does not try to engage in the ongoing debate between purpose,
intent, and motive, all of which different commentators distinguish in
different ways.221 Instead, the Article argues that the ECJ should
take a purposive, flexible approach, with the goal of striking the best
possible balance between sovereignty, integration, and tax avoidance,
given the impossibility of striking an ideal balance without greater
input from Member States and the EU as a whole. The Court would
still be able to strike down measures that disproportionately restrict
220. See, e.g., Wattel, supra note 168, at 205.
221. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 13, at 730 (distinguishing between purpose and
intent); Posner, supra note 216, at 272 (distinguishing between intent and motive).
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freedom of movement or are intended more as a barrier to integration
than as a way to police tax avoidance, but this ability would be tem-
pered by consideration of the reasons for the Court's jurisdiction, as
well as the Member State's intentions in passing the measure.
V. CONCLUSION
The ECJ's creation of a European anti-avoidance doctrine is
fraught with problems. Taxpayers in the EU face greater tax avoid-
ance. Member States face a loss of both the ability to raise revenue
and the sovereignty to prevent tax avoidance. Ultimately, the EU le-
gal order as a whole faces a decision between sovereignty over direct
taxation and greater integration in the fight against tax avoidance.
Until the Member States and member institutions of the EU make
this decision, this Article argues that the best response available to
the ECJ is a replacement of the wholly artificial arrangements doc-
trine with a more flexible approach. Such an approach will ameli-
orate the conflict between integration and sovereignty and allow the
EU to consider other approaches to policing tax avoidance while not
threatening the future of the EU.
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